India International Disputes Week 2026
Keynote Address
Back to the Future: The Growing Relevance of ICCs in Resolving Disputes
Tuesday, 10 March 2026
Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri
Back to the Future: The Growing Relevance of ICCs in Resolving Disputes
Introduction
It is a matter of common knowledge that arbitration has emerged as one of the prominent Alternate Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) mechanisms to resolve the various kinds of disputes, particularly commercial disputes. When it comes to international commercial disputes, international arbitration has been a preferred choice. The corporations and business community departed from the resolution of disputes through courts and started preferring arbitration for various reasons. Some of its features, like party autonomy, confidentiality, cost effectiveness and speedy resolution of disputes, choice of those persons as arbitrators who have special domain knowledge/expertise, led disputants to go away from courts and adopt arbitration as a more preferred mode.
In recent years, arbitration has come under some criticism because of, inter alia, the mode and methodologies of arbitration and impartiality/independence of arbitrators. Above all, it is becoming more adversarial, time-consuming and prohibitively expensive. Some of these and other reasons have led the commercial world to rethink a more appropriate mechanism for dispute resolution. They want to go back to the courts, at least under certain circumstances, but feel that traditional national courts may not serve that purpose. This situation has led to the emergence of International Commercial Courts (“ICCs”), and in the past two decades, they have proliferated worldwide, transforming the landscape of cross-border commercial dispute resolution.[i]
Although these courts broadly share overarching goals, they differ widely in their jurisdictions, legal frameworks, structures, and global standing.[ii] A pivotal moment in this evolution was the creation of the Standing International Forum of Commercial Courts (“SIFoCC”) in 2017, which now brings together courts from 67 jurisdictions, representing 70% of G20 nations.[iii] This development marks a shift in how states and legal systems approach complex, high-stakes international disputes, with some ICCs attempting to position themselves to rival the role traditionally held by international commercial arbitration.
The rise of ICCs raises profound questions about their role and impact. Have they emerged to fill a genuine gap in the need for more efficient dispute resolution mechanisms to support global commerce, or are they a response to the perceived decline in the relevance of state courts? Critics argue that ICCs risk fostering ‘caviar justice’ – by creating an exclusive system accessible primarily to large corporations– while others suggest that they serve broader geopolitical and economic interests.[iv] Additionally, have ICCs emerged due to the limitations of international commercial arbitration, such as increasing costs, delays, ethical concerns, limited jurisdiction, weak precedents, and restricted reviews, prompting a shift toward more effective dispute resolution methods?
In many ways, resolving international disputes could, in the past, be likened to choosing between two journeys to the same destination – justice. Courts provided a more rigid, set itinerary, while arbitration allowed greater flexibility, albeit at a higher cost. However, currently the distinction between the two is no longer so clear. Both ICCs and arbitral tribunals are evolving, with ICCs adopting arbitration-like processes and arbitral tribunals increasingly integrating judicial elements. In today’s legal landscape, choosing between them is more about the experience, the risks involved, and the ultimate goals, especially enforcement.[v]
But the fact that these courts have arbitration-like features makes the concept of ICCs sound intriguing yet paradoxical. Strictly speaking, proceedings before ICCs are neither arbitration nor litigation in its conventional sense before a national court. Rather, in nature, proceedings before ICCs are more akin to a combination of both. In recent years, the international arbitration community has been drawn to the establishment of ICCs in various jurisdictions across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Some have claimed that ICCs are competitors to arbitration because they offer an alternative forum for the international business community.[vi] Others, however, have remained sceptical about the practical values of these new worldwide dispute-resolving platforms.
In this context, further questions that are debated are: How have these ICCs been performing? Are they now in a better position to challenge arbitration? Both forums can offer similar highs and lows, yet they may still lead to entirely different outcomes. This evolving interplay will undoubtedly shape the future of international commercial dispute resolution, and these issues are explored further in this address.
There is yet another significant development taking place in geopolitics in the last few years, which has caused enormous disruption in the UN-governed political and economic world order. This disruptive world order has prompted the movement of capital and enterprises towards safe havens. In such a scenario, debate about the role of ICCs has gained further momentum.
My address today examines the evolving relationship between ICCs and international arbitration, exploring their convergence and divergence in shaping transnational commercial justice. In the Introduction, I have already provided a roadmap for the discussion. Hereinafter, Part I very briefly touches upon The Rise of ICCs: Historical Context and Global Trends, which traces the geopolitical and economic forces behind the emergence of ICCs as state-led initiatives to address cross-border commercial disputes. Part II narrates the factors that have led to the development of IICs. Part III, which is the central theme of my address, would discuss the position and status which the SICC has gained in this eco-system and its contribution to the growth of international commercial jurisprudence. In this process, I will cover some notable recent judgments of the SICC which have shaped not just the present but also the future of transnational justice. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion on the future of ICCs and Arbitration, reflecting on the complementary roles of ICCs and arbitration, emphasizing opportunities for innovation, collaboration, and convergence in the global framework for better resolution of cross-border commercial disputes.
Part I: The Rise of ICCs: Historical Context and Global Trends
The relationship between arbitration and litigation is not fixed. It is not so much a tug-of-war, but rather a gradual ebb and flow, or, even more figuratively speaking, a pendulum swinging from time to time in favour of arbitration or litigation before the courts. Embodied within the expression ‘swinging pendulum’, there is a presumption that it is possible to attract legal work from one platform (arbitration) to another (litigation) and vice versa. Of course, this presumption might be true in the modern world where the rapid advancement of technology and the globalisation of commerce have given business entities a much greater variety of choices for dispute resolution. However, it is not something unique to this century.[vii]What exactly does the generic term ‘ICC’ embrace? ICCs are specialized tribunals embedded within the domestic court systems of their home states, but they are specifically designed and customized to handle complex cross-border commercial disputes.[viii] Today, states have a clearer understanding that efficient dispute resolution is a crucial component of the ecosystem that sustains international trade in our interconnected world. ICCs are designed to place adjudication over international disputes in ‘more expert hands’ than if they went to the ordinary courts, even the ordinary commercial courts.[ix] Recurring features include, among others, a set of flexible procedural rules comparable to those used in international arbitration, multilingual court proceedings, the recruitment of overseas judges or foreign legal experts, the possibility of party representation by foreign lawyers, expedited proceedings, and dispositive motions.[x]
They are distinct from international judicial bodies, which commentators have observed should have the following characteristics:
(1) must be permanent and exist independently from a particular case or series of cases;
(2) must have been established by an international legal instrument or some international legal acts deriving their force from treaties;
(3) must rely on public international law to resolve cases;
(4) must decide those cases on the basis of rules of procedure, which pre-exist the case and usually cannot be modified by the parties; and
(5) issue legally binding judgments.[xi]
ICCs meet several key criteria of judicial institutions, in that they are: (1) permanent bodies; (2) follow established procedural rules; and (3) issue legally binding judgments.[xii] However, unlike international courts formed under international treaties, they are created through domestic legal systems and rely on national, not international law, to resolve disputes. Their international character stems from their work, rather than their legal framework. They are, in fact, specialist domestic courts focusing on international commerce.[xiii] The key distinction between ICCs and international courts lies in their jurisdiction and purpose. ICCs focus on resolving private and commercial disputes between private parties, while international courts handle public international law disputes involving states as at least one of the parties.
In the past two decades, International Commercial Courts (“ICCs”) have emerged worldwide, transforming the landscape of cross-border commercial dispute resolution. Although these courts broadly share overarching goals, they differ widely in jurisdiction, legal frameworks, structure, and global standing. A pivotal moment in this evolution was the creation of the Standing International Forum of Commercial Courts (“SIFoCC”) in 2017, which now brings together courts from 67 jurisdictions, representing 70% of G20 nations.[xiv] This development marks a shift in how states and legal systems approach complex, high-stakes international disputes, with some ICCs attempting to position themselves to rival the role traditionally held by international commercial arbitration.
Several other countries have also established ICCs. However, not all proposals to establish ICCs have been successful. Moreover, many ICCs established did not have an international outlook. As detailed hereinafter, perhaps SICC became the first international commercial court with a truly international flavour as it imbibed many such features, including appointment of judges from various countries viz., International Judges (“IJs”) drawn both from common law as well as civil law jurisdictions.
In many ways, resolving international disputes could, in the past, be likened to choosing between two journeys to the same destination – justice. Courts provided a more rigid, set itinerary, while arbitration allowed greater flexibility, albeit at a higher cost. However, currently the distinction between the two is no longer so clear. Both ICCs and arbitral tribunals are evolving, with ICCs adopting arbitration-like processes, and arbitral tribunals often integrating more judicial elements. In today’s legal landscape, choosing between them is more about the experience, the risks involved, and the ultimate goals, especially enforcement.
But the fact that these courts have arbitration-like features makes the concept of ICCs sound intriguing yet paradoxical. Strictly speaking, proceedings before ICCs are neither arbitration nor litigation in its conventional sense before a national court. Rather, in nature, proceedings before ICCs are more akin to a combination of both. In recent years, the international arbitration community has been drawn to the establishment of ICCs in various jurisdictions across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Some have claimed that ICCs are competitors to arbitration because they offer an alternative forum for the international business community.[xv]
The rise of ICCs raises profound questions about their role and impact. Have they emerged to fill a genuine gap in the need for more efficient dispute resolution mechanisms to support global commerce, or are they a response to the perceived decline in the relevance of state courts? Critics argue that ICCs risk fostering ‘caviar justice’ – by creating an exclusive system accessible primarily to large corporations– while others suggest that they serve broader geopolitical and economic interests.[xvi] Additionally, have ICCs emerged due to the limitations of international commercial arbitration, such as increasing costs, delays, ethical concerns, limited jurisdiction, weak precedents, and restricted reviews, prompting a shift toward more effective dispute resolution methods? Some years and one pandemic later, arbitration continues to thrive. How have these ICCs been performing? Are they now in a better position to challenge arbitration? Both forums can offer similar highs and lows, yet they may still lead to entirely different outcomes. This evolving interplay will undoubtedly shape the future of international commercial dispute resolution, and these issues are explored further in this address.
Part II: Key Factors Contributing to the Ascendance of ICCs
Today’s ICCs operate alongside domestic courts, which retain general jurisdiction over local matters.[xvii] These courts serve as a new forum for cross-border disputes, with some of them aiming to attract cases in a globally competitive environment.[xviii] Unlike earlier phases of judicial globalization, where domestic courts implemented international rules, these courts are now evolving into rule-makers themselves, influencing the legal framework for international disputes and foreshadowing the establishment of transnational commercial justice.[xix] This marks a shift in authority towards domestic jurisdictions in global dispute resolution.[xx]
So what are the factors which have contributed to the development of ICCs? Some of these are mentioned below:
(a) Arbitration Challenges: Challenges which international arbitration as a part of ADR has been facing have contributed to the growth of ICCs. Apart from the fact that international commercial arbitration is no more perceived as cost-effective and speedy, there are a few other challenges faced by the arbitral process, which include, albeit in some cases, bias of the arbitrators, outcome of certain disputes involving complex issues, particularly investment treaty disputes which has raised the issues of sovereignty, etc. There are also challenges of inclusion of those Parties in arbitration proceedings which are not signatory to the arbitration agreement (in Indian context, judgment of the Supreme Court in in Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd.).[xxi] The arbitral awards have also faced difficulties when it comes to enforcement in different jurisdictions. That apart, there is a conflict of laws insofar as the arbitrability of certain kinds of disputes is concerned, which raises concerns (e.g., the judgment in Booz Allen in India holds that matters are non-arbitrable, in contrast to the judgment of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Anupam Mittal v. Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings).[xxii]
Many private wealth disputes cannot be resolved effectively through arbitration. Trust validity, mental capacity, supervisory powers, rectification and the rights of minor or unborn beneficiaries fall within the competence of courts.[xxiii] The Singapore Court of Appeal’s discussions in cases such as BTN v BTP (2020) and AnAn Group v VTB Bank (2020) have highlighted the limits of arbitration,[xxiv] particularly when public supervisory functions or insolvency considerations are engaged. Courts in offshore jurisdictions have similarly noted that trust arbitration clauses cannot displace judicial oversight where the welfare of beneficiaries or the integrity of trust administration is at stake. The judicial character of ICCs, therefore, fills a structural gap that arbitration cannot address.
(b) Investment Disputes: Establishing a fair, unbiased, competent, and corruption-free dispute resolution process has become the ultimate goal for many states seeking to build investor confidence in their courts. Additionally, some states have set their sights on creating regional or even global legal hubs, offering a wide range of remedies through both public and private institutions. Consequently, ICCs have emerged across various jurisdictions to address the demands of the evolving global business environment. ICCs represent a ‘signal’ of a new era in global adjudication, where judicial globalisation is driven from the ground up by domestic jurisdictions, rather than through international law.[xxv] Through their procedural and substantive rules, they shape global norms and influence the international legal landscape.[xxvi] The commercial legal landscape is evolving, with courts and lawyers increasingly adopting an international perspective. Thus, on the one hand, ICC takes care of some of the problems which the arbitral process faces and on the other hand, it adopts the good features of arbitration into the judicial process.
(c) Fusion of Common & Civil Law: As the divides between common and civil law, as well as Western and Eastern legal outlooks, narrow, the demand for ICCs might rise.[xxvii] ICCs can not only be differentiated from other domestic commercial courts by their caseload, but also by their origins. Perhaps, “[i]nternational commercial courts are best understood as the result of a new (post-Westphalian) political imperative, whereas domestic commercial courts were established when an older (Westphalian) political imperative held sway.”[xxviii]
In other words, some of the new ICCs combine public interest considerations with the self-determination typically found in international commercial arbitration. Often described as a ‘careful marriage between litigation and arbitration’, these ICCs are perhaps best characterised as hybrids – distinct from traditional national court litigation, yet certainly not international arbitration.[xxix] As I demonstrate hereinafter, Singapore International Commercial Court is the only fully functional global ICC, which ticks all the aforesaid boxes.
(d) Exploring Safe Havens: Patrons of wealth creation and transaction have become increasingly global, yet the legal framework that governs them remains essentially territorial/domestic. As a result, high-net-worth individuals and family-owned corporations must navigate structural tariffs, financial sanctions, regulatory transformations driven by conflicts, weaknesses in multilateral institutions, and rapid technological change. In such a scenario, jurisdictions can provide consistent legal standards, sophisticated adjudicatory capacity and enforceable outcomes play an increasingly central role.
Some of the global instabilities which have been rising may be recapitulated in brief:
(a) Tariff wars are leading to a series of tariff disputes.
(b) Conflicts and wars: Ukraine, Venezuela, Israel-Hamas, US/Israel-Iran and even Pakistan-Afghanistan.
(c) Weakening of multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms, such as the World Trade Organizations’s permanent body.
Technological disruptions: Digital assets, algorithmic trading, artificial intelligence-based advisory tools, and cross-border data flows create new asset categories whose legal status remains unsettled. It has led the investment to be shifted to safe havens, particularly by wealth creators and consequently, safe harbours for dispute resolution in the form of ICCs.
Part III: International in Outlook, International in Composition: The SICC
As some commentators describe it, SICC is ‘the only example of a truly international commercial court that does not operate in an enclave’.[xxx] This is very well reflected in SICC’s power to hear cases by virtue of the forum selection clause, as well as cases transferred to it directly from the Singapore High Court.[xxxi] Although SICC is part of the general division of the Singapore High Court, it differs from the Singapore High Court as: the court proceedings may be confidential…; parties may apply for an order to replace Singapore evidential rules with other rules of evidence; a party may apply to have a question of foreign law determined on the basis of submissions rather than proof; parties may contract out or limit their rights to appeal; and a simplified discovery regime is adopted.[xxxii]
So, what are the key features that make SICC truly international?
(a) It has been suggested that the SICC’s success can be attributed to its reputable and internationally diverse bench and its flexible procedural rules. The procedural rules of the SICC are strongly influenced by the arbitration procedural model and by the triumph of party autonomy. A typical example is that the “open court” presumption can be overridden by parties’ agreement or by parties’ application to the court for a confidentiality order. As part of the Singapore judiciary, the SICC comprises local and international judges from common law and civil law jurisdictions. In fact, the presence of International Judges makes the application of foreign law in certain cases and provides flexibility for global litigants. One such case was the BNP Paribas matter from 2016,[xxxiii] which I will touch upon later.
The Singaporean legislature has even amended its constitution to enable the appointment of these International Judges. Its international composition enhances its credibility in handling complex cross-border commercial disputes. Ensuring a high degree of neutrality and familiarity with various legal systems makes these courts attractive to international litigants who might be concerned about bias or domestic unfamiliarity by reassuring them that their disputes will be adjudicated by jurists familiar with global commercial practices and legal traditions beyond the host country.[xxxiv] Currently, 21 of the SICC’s 26 international judges hail from common law jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, the US, Canada, India, and Hong Kong SAR.[xxxv] Four judges represent civil law jurisdictions: France, Germany, Japan, and China.[xxxvi]
(b) Thus, the SICC may, on a party’s application, order that the proceedings and judgment remain confidential, a feature it borrows from arbitration.[xxxvii] Described as “arbitration in litigation”, the most important distinguishing factor of the SICC is its broader target market. Unlike other ICCs, which focus on facilitating the development of a particular economic zone (for example, the DIFC, QIC, and AIFC), the SICC aims to promote the entire country of Singapore for resolving international and commercial disputes involving transnational parties.[xxxviii]
(c) Integration of arbitration, flexible rules, as already explained.
(d) One of the major aims of the SICC is to develop “a freestanding body of international commercial law” for the international audience.[xxxix] In fact, with some remarkable and outstanding judgments with the civil and common law principles, it has been able to create a unique jurisprudence in international commercial cases, which has attained a remarkable degree of acceptability.
(e) SICC’s domain has grown and evolved over a period of time by chartering into new territories, and cross-border insolvency is one such example. It is, thus, futuristic even as well. A significant step taken by SICC in this regard is to critically examine its functioning and discuss future prospects every year by holding a two-day SICC Conference immediately after the opening of the legal year (OLY).
Part IV: Experience of the SICC: the Court through the Lens of its Judgments
I demitted my office as the Judge of the Supreme Court of India in March 2019, and within a few days, Justice Sundaresh Menon, Chief Justice of Singapore, offered me an appointment as an International Judge (“IJ”) in the SICC. By this time, SICC's robust functioning, efficiency, and a futuristic approach had already been established. I immediately agreed to the proposal and was appointed as the IJ in August 2019. The last 6½ years of my work and experience in ICJ have been extremely beneficial, in fact, transformative, if I may say so.
There is much more professionalism in taking up the cases, with qualitative case management and strict adherence to timelines, thereby ensuring quick disposal (this experience is briefly recapitulated). Some of the unique features of SICC whereby SICC has created a special place for itself are as under:
(a) In fact, the resolution of Cross-Border Private Wealth Disputes and Finance disputes needs safe harbours. In the current geopolitical environment of sanctions and the collapse of global norms of transnational trade law, the role of ICCs becomes important as these courts address these challenges by providing forums that resolve multi-jurisdictional disputes with clarity and authority. In fact, the introduction of baseline thresholds as a precondition for ICCs to exercise jurisdiction is very helpful in resolving cross-border private wealth disputes. For instance, while SICC allows litigants to opt into its jurisdiction contractually, the SICC Rules, 2021 grant SICC the power to refuse to hear a dispute if the exercise of jurisdiction by SICC would contradict its international and commercial character or constitute an abuse of its process. This unique facet of the SICC rules overcomes the shortcomings of arbitration while preventing jurisdictional overreach.[xl]
(b) Procedural Innovations: ICCs such as the SICC further exemplify this capability through their procedures and jurisprudence. The Court’s flexible evidential framework allows foreign counsel to appear and foreign law to be applied directly. This is particularly relevant for trust disputes, which often rely on governing laws from offshore jurisdictions.
(c) More important aspect is the advancement of principles in deciding complex commercial law disputes. It is difficult to cover all important judgments, however, the following judgments would prove my point authoritatively:
Comparable tensions have arisen where foreign counter‑sanctions legislation seeks to neutralize arbitration agreements and foreign jurisdiction clauses. ICCs have also assumed particular importance in disputes involving sovereign or state‑linked wealth. The SICC’s decision in Hulley Enterprises Ltd, Yukos Universal Ltd and Veteran Petroleum Ltd v The Russian Federation (2025) demonstrates the Court’s willingness to engage with questions of state immunity, consent to arbitration and transnational issue estoppel in enforcement proceedings arising from highly politicized investment disputes. By recognizing that determinations made by seat courts could preclude re-litigation of consent and jurisdictional issues in Singapore, even where state immunity was invoked, the SICC reinforced its role as a credible forum for the enforcement of awards within the constraints of international law.[xliii]
The judgment of the court highlights the importance of substance over form in international arbitration and provides that, irrespective of the submission style (Memorial or pleading), there is no distinction in the methodology of assessing ‘pleading points’ in different legal systems. On the question of assessment of bias, the court, relying on the decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in X S.p.A v. Y B.V.,[xlvii] held that the assurance of the independence and impartiality of a tribunal is “one of the pillars of any State ruled by law” in the following words:
“[T]he test is whether there exist facts and circumstances that give rise to a reasonable suspicion or apprehension of bias in the fair-minded and informed observer… This is a question of natural justice and due process, of which the perceived independence and impartiality of the adjudicator is a facet. Such considerations transcend both the common law and civil law traditions, and apply equally to arbitral tribunals as much as they do to courts and other forums that exercise quasi-judicial powers.”[xlviii]
This judgment, which has become a landmark case on the subject, aptly demonstrates the significance of judicial diversity in the SICC.[xlix] One more unique aspect of the court’s organisational structure is that the Chief Justice can appoint an International Judge to adjudicate a specific case based on their expertise in a foreign jurisdiction or a particular subject matter, which is seen in the next case I will discuss.
However, there was a significant overlap between the SICC case and the defendants’ French counteraction, in which the defendants requested a finding declaring that the pertinent facility agreements and personal guarantees were illegal and “non-existent” under French law. Due to the French counteractions’ near resemblance to the SICC proceedings, there were two separate proceedings that could result in conflicting rulings if pursued concurrently. The SICC exercised its case management jurisdiction due to the numerous procedures. The SICC noted that issuing a limited stay of proceedings is not justified by the possibility of contradictory rulings. The court ruled that when using its discretion, it must consider all pertinent factors and give the effective and fair settlement of the entire issue first priority.
The applicable controlling law of the dispute, the validity of the defendants’ counterclaim, and the stay application were among the many questions the SICC assessed. The defendants argued that the choice of law was not made in good faith, requiring both the French and Singaporean courts to use French law, even though the personal guarantees specifically stated that Singapore law governed the arrangement. The SICC concluded that the choice of Singaporean law was initially legitimate. The court stated that “this court, being an international commercial court with a French International Judge, is capable of applying French law to resolve the dispute,” so even if it were to determine that French law applies in this case, this finding would not be decisive in its decision to grant a limited stay of proceedings.
In other words, the ability and experience of the Court’s International Judges to apply foreign law clearly influences the SICC’s decision not to halt the proceedings on case management grounds. In the end, the SICC rejected the motion, finding that granting the defendants' stay request would go against efficient case management and that the defendants purposefully started the French action to impede the prompt settlement of the Singapore proceedings.[li]
| SN | Milestone event | Amount Payable (in USD) | Amount Payable (in USD) | Payable by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main action heard by a single Judge | Main action heard by 3 Judges | |||
| 1 | On filing the Originating Application and the Claimant’s Statement. | $3,740 | $5,390 | Claimant |
| 2 | On filing the Defendant’s Statement | $3,740 | $5,390 | Defendant |
| 3 | On the date on which witness statements are ordered to be exchanged | $19,140 | $22,440 | Each party |
| 4 | On filing the Memorial | $19,140 | $22,440 | Claimant |
| 5 | On filing the Counter‑Memorial | $19,140 | $22,440 | Defendant |
By way of background, this case concerns an investment in a project firm incorporated in the claimant State (an EU Member State). The defendants were two UK-incorporated businesses (the UK Investors) with a structure that made the second defendant a subsidiary of the first. 72% of the project company’s shares were owned by the second defendant. The Holding Company, which was incorporated in a non-EU Member State and owned the first defendant in full, retained the remaining shares. In response to disagreements over the project, the Holding Company initiated arbitration against the State on September 8, 2020, pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty (the BIT Arbitration). In accordance with Article 26 of the ECT, the UK Investors initiated arbitration against the State on September 9, 2020 (the ECT Arbitration). Even though the UK had officially left the EU at the time, EU law continued to apply to the country during a transition period. Singapore served as the seat for the ECT Arbitration. In the ECT Arbitration, the panel ruled in favour of the UK investors.[lviii] The State raised three jurisdictional issues in its application to the SICC to have the award set aside:
Additionally, the State argued that the award was contrary to public policy because it contravened basic EU legal norms. The State specifically argued that if it complied with the verdict, it would be subject to contradictory responsibilities because doing so would result in penalties under EU law. The SICC dismissed all of the State’s arguments. Regarding the most important aspect of the Intra-EU Objection, the Court held that a State’s agreement to arbitrate under Article 26 of the ECT in a Singapore-seated arbitration is not invalidated by EU law under principles of international law.[lix]
The State contended that Article 26 of the ECT, which permits investor-State arbitration, is irreconcilable with the autonomy concept embodied in the EU’s founding treaties, as the CJEU had held in Achmea and Komstroy. The SICC acknowledged that Achmea proved that arbitration clauses in intra-EU bilateral investment treaties were incompatible with EU law, and that Komstroy applied the same logic to Article 26 ECT of the EU legal system, with ex tunc effect.
The SICC, however, ruled that the judgments in Achmea and Komstroy do not invalidate arbitrations under Article 26 of the ECT as a matter of public international law, nor do they bind courts or tribunals located outside the EU. In fact, international law governs arbitration agreements under Article 26 of the ECT, and the EU constitutional values of autonomy and supremacy apply only within the EU court system; they do not apply globally.
Regarding the Subject-Matter Objection, the SICC ruled that the ECT clearly defined “investment” and that the controversial “Salini criteria” did not need to be met.[lx] The court also clarified that the Salini criteria should only be used in situations where the treaty in question does not define “investment”. As a result, the interests of UK investors constituted a protected “investment.”
Because the BIT Arbitration and the ECT Arbitration did not involve the same investor or the same dispute, the Court rejected the FITR Objection too. Regarding the Public Policy Objection, the SICC determined that sustaining the award would not “shock the conscience” (the pertinent criteria under Singapore law) and that incompatibility with a foreign law did not, by itself, offend Singapore public policy. The SICC also concluded that the State was not entitled to relief because any conflicting duties it had arose from its signature of the relevant treaties (the EU and the ECT).
This ruling emphasises the importance of selecting a strategic arbitral seat for intra-EU investor-state disputes and supports Singapore’s pro-arbitration position. Despite concerns that intra-EU investment arbitration would be unlawful, the ruling offers hope. The SICC affirmed that any inconsistency between the EU treaties and Article 26 ECT is limited to the EU legal system. In other words, the impact of Achmea and Komstroy is limited to investor-state arbitrations seated in the EU or intended to be enforced there. This illustrates the boundaries of the idea that EU legislation takes precedence over conventional international law.[lxi]
Crucially, the SICC’s ruling is among the rare judgments by any court outside Europe that has denied the Salini criteria’s applicability in cases where an investment treaty defines “investment” differently. This also gives helpful guidance on a contentious issue among investment treaty tribunals. The State’s public policy argument was rejected by the SICC, which confirms the high threshold and limited application of the public policy ground. This aligns with Singapore’s long-standing support for enforcement and its dedication to arbitration finality.[lxii]
Conclusion: Future of ICCs and Arbitration
Despite changes in geopolitics, global interconnection and commerce continue to be durable, despite current domestic populist sentiments emphasising economic nationalism amid geopolitical uncertainty and growing wealth inequality. The significance of international economic ties is not diminished by ideas like onshoring, near-shoring, and friend-shoring.[lxiii] Bilateral treaties are becoming a norm (e.g., India,-UK, India-EU, India-USA).
Furthermore, even as its techniques change, equitable and efficient dispute resolution will remain essential in international commercial commerce. Businesses, which frequently value secrecy and the efficient enforcement of decisions, seek assurance through clear, consistent legislation and dependable, economical, and speedy conflict resolution procedures. In the end, they want conflicts, particularly international ones, to be settled quickly, cheaply, and effectively.
The advent of ICCs marks a significant change in international dispute settlement. The decision between arbitration and ICCs is influenced by important factors, including enforcement and transparency.
By aligning ICCs and arbitral systems with common transnational norms without sacrificing the independence of each jurisdiction, initiatives such as the SIFoCC promote cooperation. The SIFoCC promotes convergence that takes into account both national diversity and international commercial standards through discussion and the exchange of best practices. International business is more consistent and predictable as a result of harmonisation efforts by ICCs, arbitral tribunals, and organisations such as UNCITRAL, which improve efficiency and reduce legal fragmentation. Despite taking different routes, their objectives coincide, emphasising concepts of interconnectedness and coordination.
For a variety of reasons, users will either favour private or public adjudicatory methods depending upon their needs. Therefore, undoubtedly, arbitration as a means of settling international commercial disputes would remain important. Unparalleled ICCs not only create a niche but would thrive as well. In this scenario, SICC, with its unique feature and safe harbour, is going to attract attention ad would be accessed by the litigators for better resolution of their disputes very frequently.
[i]See, VK Rajah SC, ‘Courting Global Commerce: The Shifting Dynamics Between International Arbitration and International Commercial Courts’, (2025) 42(2) Arbitration International, pp. 141 – 206. I have used some parts of this paper to prepare this lecture.
[ii] See, Balram, ‘The Swinging Pendulum: International Arbitration and the Rise of International Commercial Courts’, forthcoming in (2026) 44 (1) ASA Bulletin. I have used some parts of this paper to prepare this lecture.
[iii] See, SIFoCC, Members, https://sifocc.org/members-partners/members/.
[iv] Georgia Antonopoulou and Xandra Kramer, ‘The International Business Courts Saga Continued: NCC First Judgment–BIBC Proposal Unplugged’, (Conflict of Laws.net, 27 March 2019) available at: <https://conflictoflaws.net/2019/the-international-business-courts-saga-continued-ncc-first-judgment-bibc-proposal-unplugged/>; Lucas C. Alcolea, The Rise of the International Commercial Court: A Threat to the Rule of Law?, (2022)13 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, pp. 413, 415.
[v] Balram, supra note 2.
[vi] See for example, Michael Hwang, ‘Commercial courts and international arbitration – competitors or partners?’ (2015) 31 Arbitration International p. 193; Xandra Kramer and John Sorabji, ‘International Business Courts in Europe and Beyond: A Global Competition for Justice?’ (2019) Erasmus Law Review 1, available at: <www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/ELR/2019/1/ELR-D-19-00023.pdf>.
[vii] Bernard Eder, ‘The Driving Forces behind the Swinging Pendulum’, in Sundaresh Menon and Anselmo Reyes (edn) Transnational Commercial Disputes in an Age of Anti-Globalism and Pandemic (Hart, 2022) 118.
[viii] V. K. Rajah, W(h)ither Adversarial Commercial Dispute Resolution?, (2017) 33 Arbitration International 17, 26; Gu Weixia & Jacky Tam, The Global Rise of International Commercial Courts: Typology and Power Dynamics, (2021) 22 Chicago Journal of International Law, pp. 443, 445.
[ix] George A. Bermann, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration, in Chin Leng Lim (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Arbitration ( Cambridge University Press 2021) pp. 161-162.
[x] Ibid.; Gu & Tam, supra note 8.
[xi] Cesare P. R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, (1999) 31
NYU Journal of International Law and Politics, p. 709; See also, Denise Wong, The Rise of the International Commercial Court: What Is It and Will It Work?, (2014) 33 Civil Justice Quarterly 205, pp. 214–15.
[xii] Georgious Dimitropoulos, The Design of International Commercial Courts, in International Commercial Courts: The Future of Transnational Adjudication 452–53 (Stavros Brekoulakis & Georgios Dimitropoulos eds, CUP 2022).
[xiii] Lucy Reed, International Dispute Resolution Courts: Retreat or Advance? 10th John E. C. Brierley Memorial
Lecture, (2017-18) 4 McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution, pp 129, 137, available at: < https://mjdr.openum.ca/files/sites/154/2018/09/Reed_PDF-1.pdf>.
[xiv] See SIFoCC, Members, available at: <https://sifocc.org/members-partners/members/>.
[xv] See, Micheal Hwang, ‘Commercial courts and international arbitration – competitors or partners?’ (2015) 31 Arbitration International, p. 193; Xandra Kramer and John Sorabji, ‘International Business Courts in Europe and Beyond: A Global Competition for Justice?’ (2019) Erasmus Law Review, p. 1, available at: <https://repub.eur.nl/pub/125069/ELR-D-19-00023.pdf>.
[xvi] See, Georgia Antonopoulou and Xandra Kramer, supra note 4; Lucas C. Alcolea, The Rise of the International Commercial Court: A Threat to the Rule of Law?, (2022) 13 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 413, 415.
[xvii] Ibid., at 28.
[xviii] Ibid.
[xix] Ibid.
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1634
[xxii] Anupam Mittal v. Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings, [2023] SGCA 1.
[xxiii] Nicholas Holland, ‘Arbitration Of Trust Disputes’, available at: <https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/arbitration--dispute-resolution/552730/arbitration-of-trust-disputes#authors>.
[xxiv] BTN & Anr. v. BTP & Anr., (2020) SGCA 105; AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company), (2020) SGCA 33.
[xxv] Georgios Dimitropoulos and Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘International Commercial Courts: The Future of Transnational Adjudication – an Introduction’, in Stavros Brekoulakis and Georgios Dimitropoulos (eds), International Commercial Courts: The Future of Transnational Adjudication (Cambridge University Press 2022) p. 40.
[xxvi] Ibid.
[xxvii] John E Middleton, ‘The Rise of the International Commercial Court’ (Hong Kong International Commercial Law Conference, 21 September 2018) p. 2, available at: <https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/FedJSchol/2018/18.html>.
[xxviii] Michael Patchett-Joyce, ‘Private Autonomy in International Commercial Dispute Resolution, in International Commercial Courts: The Future of Transnational Adjudication’ in Stavros Brekoulakis and Georgios Dimitropoulos (eds), International Commercial Courts: The Future of Transnational Adjudication (Cambridge University Press 2022) pp. 672, 683–84.
[xxix] See the speech deliver by Justice Steven Chong at the British Maritime Law Association Dinner, Steven Chong, “The Singapore International Commercial Court: A New Opening in a Forked Path” (London 21 October 2015).
[xxx] Sean David Yates, ‘New International Commercial Courts: A Delocalised Approach’, (2024) 15 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, pp. 54, 54–72.
[xxxi] Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (Singapore, 2020 Rev Ed) Sections 18D and 18F, available at: <https://sso.agc.gov.sg/ACT/SCJA1969>.
[xxxii] Rajah, supra note 1; Andrew Godwin, Ian Ramsay and Miranda Webster, ‘International Commercial Courts: The Singapore Experience’, (2017) 18 Melbourn Journal of International Law, pp. 219-225.
[xxxiii] BNP Paribas Wealth Management v. Jacob Agam and Ruth Agam, [2016] SGHC(I) 5. See also for a detailed discussion, Balram, supra note 2.
[xxxiv] Rajah, supra note 1.
[xxxv] SICC, Judges, available at: <https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/singapore-international-commercial-court/about-the-sicc/judges>.
[xxxvi] Ibid.
[xxxvii] SICC Rules 2021, Order 16, Rule 9; Rule 97 of SICC Practice Directions of 1 July 2023.
[xxxviii] Balram, supra note 2.
[xxxix] Godwin, Ramsay and Webster, supra note 32, pp. 219, 221.
[xl] Tine Abraham, Shourya Bari and Meghana Senthil Kumar, ‘Navigating international commercial courts: balancing flexibility and certainty in global disputes’ (International Bar Association, 4 April 2025) available at: < https://www.ibanet.org/navigating-international-commercial-courts>.
[xli] Credit Suisse Trust Ltd. v. Ivanishvili, Bidzina & Ors., [2024] SGCA(I) 5.
[xlii] CPIT Investments Ltd. v. Qilin World Capital Ltd., [2016] SGHC(I) 04.
[xliii] Hulley Enterprises Ltd, Yukos Universal Ltd and Veteran Petroleum Ltd v. The Russian Federation, [2025] SGHC(I) 19.
[xliv] CFJ and CFK v CFL and CFM, 2023 SGHC (I) 1.
[xlv] ibid, para 1.
[xlvi] CFJ, supra note 44.
[xlvii] X S.p.A v Y B.V., 4A 386/2015.
[xlviii] CFJ supra note 44, para 51.
[xlix] For detailed discussion of this case, See Balram, supra note 1.
[l] BNP Paribas Wealth Management v Jacob Agam and another, [2016] SGHC(I) 5 The composition of the bench was Steven Chong J, Roger Giles IJ and Dominique Hascher IJ.
[li] For detailed discussion, see, Balram, ‘The Swinging Pendulum: International Arbitration and the Rise of International Commercial Courts’ (MIDS LL.M. thesis, Geneva Graduate Institute and the University of Geneva).
[lii] SICC Rules, Order 26.
[liii] ibid, Order 26, Rule 3; The table presented here is an abridged version of Table 2 in Order 26, which can be referred to for more detailed information.
[liv] SICC Rules, Order 26, Rule 1.
[lv] DNZ v DOA and another, [2026] SGHC(I)1; See also for a detailed discussion, Balram, supra note 2.
[lvi] Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, CJEU Case C-284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158.
[lvii] Republic of Moldova v Komstroy, CJEU Case C-741/19 ECLI:EU:C:2021:655.
[lviii] See also, a very helpful summary of the case prepared by Colin Liew and Wei Shing Ngo, available at: <https://www.providencelawasia.com/news/dnz-v-doa-and-another-2026-sghci-1/>.
[lix] Ibid.
[lx] Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (16 July 2001)
[lxi] See, Liew and Shing Ngo, supra note 58.
[lxii] See, Liew and Shing Ngo, supra note 58.
[lxiii] Gillian Tett, ‘Globalisation Is not Dead – It’s Just Changed’ (Financial Times, 22 November 2024) available at: < https://www.ft.com/content/1cfa6b3e-16c2-41e9-a1f6-fc90afaa7a98?syn-25a6b1a6=1>.