Outcome: Appeal Allowed in part.
Facts
1 By consent order, the father agreed to provide monthly maintenance of $1,200 for the child and $300 for the mother. Two enforcement orders for maintenance arrears were made when the father fell behind on his payments. When the father sought to vary the child’s maintenance order, the DJ found that the father is barred by issue estoppel arising from the enforcement orders. The father appealed.
Court’s Decision:
2 An issue estoppel arises in situations where a litigant seeks to re-argue points which have already been the subject of a previous judicial decision. For issue estoppel to arise, it is a requirement that the issue was referred to and was the subject of argument. It is also a requirement that there is identity of subject matter in the two proceedings.: at [14].
3 The question of whether the child’s maintenance order should be varied was not considered previously in the enforcement proceedings. Accordingly, the father is not barred by issue estoppel from raising the issue in this appeal.: at [15] to [16].
4 Section 73 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”) provides that the “court may, at any time and from time to time, vary the terms of any agreement relating to the maintenance of a child … where it is satisfied that it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child to do so”. This provision is wide enough to encompass a material change in the circumstances of the parents as a basis for varying the maintenance for the child.: at [17].
5 The relevant timeframe for considering if there is a material change in circumstances is between the making of the original maintenance order and the date of the variation application. It should not be from the date of the more recent enforcement orders.: at [24] to [25].
6 The court found that there was a material change in circumstances, primarily in the parties' salaries. The father's monthly salary decreased from $4,800 to $3,000, while the mother's monthly income increased from about $3,000 to $5,265.: at [27] to [30].
7 Based on the child's current expenses of $1,475.52 and the existing maintenance order, the father was contributing about 81% of the child's expenses and 40% of his monthly income, compared to the mother's 19% of expenses and 5% of her monthly income. The court considered this disparity as a basis for revisiting their relative share of the child's maintenance.: at [32].
8 Weight should be attached to the agreement entered into by the parties. Thus, while it is accepted that the financial circumstances had changed materially (in that the father’s income had sizably decreased while the mother’s salary had increased sizably), the father should still be held to his underlying agreement to contribute 25% of his monthly income to the child’s expenses.: at [37].
9 The court varied the father's monthly child maintenance obligations from $1,200 to $750, which represents 25% of his current monthly income, in line with the proportion he had originally agreed to in the consent order.: at [37] to [39].
10 The court has the power to backdate variation orders. As ss 72 and 118 of WC allow the court to vary the maintenance orders taking into consideration the financial circumstances of the parties, financial circumstances would also be a relevant consideration in assessing the appropriateness of backdating.: at [43].
11 The court agreed that the father’s proposed start date for the backdating to be fair in that this was the time when he put the mother on notice of his intention to vary the maintenance orders. As the father’s submission is for backdating to take effect from the date of the application, that is 16 August 2023, it would not infringe the enforcement orders made earlier in respect of the maintenance arrears.: at [46].
The full text of the decision can be found here.
This summary is provided to assist the public to have a better understanding of the Court’s judgment. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s judgment.