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Surindar Singh s/o Jaswant Singh v Sita Jaswant Kaur [2014] SGCA 27

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

Facts

1 The Husband appealed against the High Court’s decision not to give effect to the Settlement Agreement entered into by him and the Wife as the division proposed in the Settlement Agreement was not just and equitable. The issues on appeal were whether there was a Settlement Agreement; whether the court is bound to give full effect to the Settlement Agreement and if not, what weight should be given to the Settlement Agreement. 

Court’s Decision:

2 If there is a binding agreement between the parties with respect to the ownership and division of the matrimonial assets made in contemplation of divorce, that will be a relevant factor in the court’s determination of what is a just and equitable division of matrimonial assets under the Women’s Charter: at [20]

3 In determining whether a binding agreement between husband and wife to settle their disputes over property and maintenance exists, the court must be guided by the legal requirements of the common law of contract because such agreements are contracts to begin with: at [20]

4 If the parties had concluded a binding agreement and one party attempted to re-negotiate its terms thereafter, that in itself would not have discharged or terminated such agreement. The agreement would remain binding, and its terms would remain in force. Once formed, the Settlement Agreement was binding and could only be varied or discharged with the consent of the other party: at [29]

5 To determine whether an agreement of the type specified in s 112(2)(e) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) exists, two elements must be met. First, there must have been an agreement with respect to the ownership and division of matrimonial assets; and second, the aforesaid agreement must have been “made in contemplation of divorce”: at [40]

6 Even though an agreement may have been reached after divorce proceedings had commenced and were not made in contemplation of divorce, s 112(2)(e) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) does not restrict the time the agreement is made to a time before divorce proceedings have commenced. It merely clarifies that the parties must have intended for the agreement to govern the allocation of matrimonial assets upon the contingency of divorce, as opposed to a time when the parties are still married: at [42].

7 In any case, the ultimate power is with the court to order a division that is just and equitable by considering all the circumstances of the case and a post-nuptial agreement cannot be enforced directly but only by the court after considering all the circumstances: at [43]

8 As a general proposition, where the parties enter into a separation agreement, especially after divorce or separation proceedings have already commenced, such a separation agreement will generally carry significant weight as they are meant to cater to the immediate needs and desires of the parties. Nevertheless, the weight to be allocated to a postnuptial agreement in each case must ultimately depend on the precise circumstances of the case: at [52]

9 In determining the weight to be given to separation agreements, regard must be had to the conduct of both parties, leading up to the prior agreement, and to their subsequent conduct, in consequence of it. Relevant factors include whether there was pressure by one side, exploitation by a dominant position to secure an unreasonable advantage, inadequate knowledge, bad legal advice, and an importance change of circumstances, unforeseen or overlooked at the time of making the agreement. This list of factors is not intended to be exhaustive: at [53]

9 Where parties had properly and fairly come to a formal separation agreement with the benefit of legal advice, the court would generally attach significant weight to that agreement unless there were good and substantial grounds for concluding that to do so would effect injustice: [54].  

The full text of the decision can be found here.
 

This summary is provided to assist the public to have a better understanding of the Court’s judgment. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s judgment.
2022/01/11

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