Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon: NUS Law Bicentennial Lecture on the Rule of Law

NUS LAW BICENTENNIAL LECTURE ON THE RULE OF LAW

Evolving Conceptions of the Rule of Law: The Singapore Experience

2 September 2026

The Honourable the Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon

Supreme Court of Singapore

Mr Murali Pillai, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Law and Ministry of Transport

Mr Eric Chua, Senior Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Law and Ministry of Social and Family Development

Professor Tan Eng Chye, President of the NUS

Professor Andrew Simester, Dean of the NUS Faculty of Law

Professor Jaclyn Neo, Director of the Centre for Asian Legal Studies

My fellow Judges

Members of the Faculty

Distinguished guests

Ladies and gentlemen

I. Introduction

1. It is a great pleasure for me to return to NUS Law at this time to deliver this lecture. Some decades ago, I sat in a classroom at this law school, as a student discovering the rule of law, largely through cases, textbooks and lectures. And like many students, I first understood it as a set of principles: among others that laws should be clear and stable; that courts should be independent; and that all persons, including those who exercise public power, should be subject to the law. Their intuitive appeal may have caused me, and perhaps others, to gloss over a crucial question: why is the rule of law a necessary thing at all? Instead, much of our attention focused on the content of the rule of law – a notoriously difficult, and I dare say, an impossible venture. Debates over “thick” and “thin” conceptions of the rule of law were pursued with passion, but as I approach the latter stages of a long career in the law, it seems to me that, until we have engaged with the “why” question, we will never get any closer to fashioning our own response to the “what” question in a way that might attract even a reasonable degree of consensus.

2. To be sure, the principles that are widely understood to inhabit even a minimal conception of the rule of law remain fundamental. But experience teaches us that the rule of law is far more important than an idea on a page. Instead, it shapes the life of a society and helps ensure that people can plan their affairs with confidence; that disputes are resolved peacefully and fairly; that power is exercised within legal limits; and that those who depend on the legal system can actually obtain justice.

3. In my very first address as Chief Justice, I wanted to explore the anterior “why” question. I found an answer in an unexpected and somewhat obscure place – a book on the law of meetings published in 1915, where the writer had observed: “Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty.” Drawing from that, I observed in that first address that, and I quote:¹

“Far from restricting liberty, law assures it. By law, we establish order, and order is key to liberty.”

4. There are three ideas that flow from that observation.

First, freedom requires order. Freedom cannot mean that each of us is entitled to act without regard to everyone else, because the unrestrained freedom of one person may curtail the freedom of another.
Second, that the order that law establishes necessarily requires us to strike a balance between the rights and interests of different individuals, as well as between the interests of individuals and of the community as a collective.
And third, how that balance is struck cannot be divorced from the societal context in which the law operates. It will necessarily be shaped by a society’s political, social and historical circumstances. And as those circumstances change, the balance may have to change with them.

5. My central argument follows from this, and it is that the rule of law is best understood, and judged, by what it delivers in practice, in the light of the legitimate imperatives arising from each society’s political, social and historical context. Clear and stable laws, independent and effective courts, and equality and accountability before the law, are sometimes described, rather pejoratively, as constituting a “thin”² conception of the rule of law because they do not themselves prescribe a complete catalogue of substantive rights. But I suggest that that description risks mistaking the appearance of the vessel for what it carries. Properly constituted, such an architecture restrains arbitrary power, sustains public trust, widens access to justice and creates the conditions for social and economic progress. The conception may be formal, but its effects are anything but thin. And, for a small nation, devoid of natural resources, and unexpectedly and newly independent, it has helped lay the foundation for 61 years of progress, stability and development.

6. This thesis develops an insight offered by Lord Sales in his 2024 Robin Cooke Lecture.³ He cautioned against expanding the rule of law until it absorbs every substantive value that a society regards as important. Those values plainly matter. But they are often contested, and attempting to fold them all into the rule of law may obscure the choices and trade-offs between them. The alternative is not an impoverished conception. As Lord Sales observed, the formal conception of the rule of law possesses substantial value in its own right, across the economic, political and moral life of a society.⁴

7. Singapore’s experience bears this out. For us, the rule of law was never an abstract aspiration. It was a practical necessity. As a small, vulnerable nation, we depended on the commitment and confidence of our people, and indeed of those who chose to trade, invest and build their lives here, in order to make something from what little we had. Legal certainty, independent courts, and equality and accountability before the law, helped provide the stability, trust and freedom from arbitrariness on which that confidence rested.

8. But if the rule of law is judged by what it delivers, it cannot ever be regarded as a finished achievement. When changing conditions threaten the legal system’s capacity to deliver justice, certainty, equality and trust, our understanding of what the rule of law requires must evolve in response. As Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong recently observed, the continued strength of our institutions depends on our willingness to “adapt and readapt them as the world changes and as Singapore progresses”.⁵

9. The journey in the United States from Plessy v Ferguson to Brown v Board of Education illustrates the point. Plessy upheld a Louisiana law requiring racial segregation on railway carriages, accepting the principle that legally mandated separation did not offend the constitutional guarantee of equality so long as the facilities provided were equal. Brown, nearly six decades later, held that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional because separate educational facilities were inherently unequal.⁶ The constitutional commitment to equality endured, but the understanding of what equality required had changed profoundly.

10. Closer to home, Senior Minister Lee has pointed to the repeal of section 377A of the Penal Code as another example of law responding as societal values and norms evolved.⁷ Section 377A reflected the prevailing social norms of an earlier era, but attitudes had changed over time. Its eventual repeal, seemingly catalysed by the tenor of a decision of the Court of Appeal,⁸ followed extensive engagement with groups holding sharply differing views. The broader point is that enduring principles may require new expression as the community and the circumstances they serve change.

11. I will develop my argument this morning in three parts.

The first examines Singapore’s historical experience and how the formal architecture of the rule of law was instrumental in securing our stability and development. This, if you like, is an exploration of the “why” question.
The second addresses four contemporary challenges: growing complexity and cost; problems that transcend national borders; the sustainability of the legal profession; and generative artificial intelligence, and considers how these challenges may require us to adapt our answer to the “what” question.
The third is a brief reflection on the responsibilities of lawyers, academics and students. The rule of law depends, ultimately, on those who will inherit our institutions and the choices they will make about how those institutions are used, protected and renewed. In a sense, this introduces the “who” question.

12. Before I proceed, let me take a moment to acknowledge the Faculty of Law for having organised this lecture in conjunction with the Bicentennial celebrations of our legal and judicial system. It started with a conversation that I had with Professor Jaclyn Neo at a Judiciary – Faculty lunch. I am deeply grateful that she developed the idea of this lecture, which kickstarts a series of five papers on different aspects of the rule of law that I will deliver over the next three months.

13. This is an especially important discussion for us to have 200 years on from the Second Charter of Justice. The Charter marked an important institutional beginning for a legal order that has since been built, tested and developed over two centuries. But a Bicentennial should invite more than reflection on the path we have travelled. It should also prompt us to ask how our laws and institutions must continue to evolve to meet the demands of a very different age.

II. The formal architecture and the Singapore experience

14. Let me then begin with the historical experience. Three features of the formal architecture of the rule of law were especially important to Singapore’s early development: legal certainty; an independent, impartial and effective judiciary; and equality and accountability before the law. Their importance lay in what they delivered. Legal certainty makes confidence and common life possible; effective courts turn rights and obligations into practical realities; and equality and accountability restrain arbitrary power and sustain public trust.

A. Legal certainty: enabling confidence and common life

15. Legal certainty is the first part of that architecture. It enables people to understand the rules that govern their conduct, anticipate the legal consequences of offending those rules and to plan their affairs accordingly. This was especially important in early Singapore, a port settlement populated by people from different lands, speaking different languages and observing different customs. Commerce required strangers to transact in the confidence that their bargains would be upheld and that disputes would be resolved according to known rules and standards.

16. Before 1826, Singapore lacked a coherent legal order for the settlement as a whole. Different communities relied largely on their own arrangements for the administration of justice.⁹ Sir Stamford Raffles attempted to introduce a uniform code in 1823, but its legal foundation was doubtful because he had acted beyond the powers conferred by the Treaty with the Sultan of Johor and the Temenggong, which authorised only the establishment of a trading factory.¹⁰ The resulting uncertainty concerned not only the content of the law, but also whether the purported law had any authority at all.

17. The breakthrough came with the promulgation of the Second Charter of Justice in 1826. The material part of the Charter empowered the Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales’ Island, Singapore and Malacca to “give and pass Judgment and Sentence according to Justice and Right”. In Regina v Willans,¹¹ a case of which most of us stumbled in our first year in law school, Sir Peter Maxwell interpreted those words as mandating the application of English law as it stood in 1826. As Justice Andrew Phang has observed, that interpretation was accepted without question for more than a century and a half.¹² For the first time in our legal history, a uniform body of law applied across the settlement.

18. But our difficulties did not end there. Because the Charter’s reception of English law was frozen as of 1826, the Legislative Council enacted section 5 of the Civil Law Act in 1878 to provide for the continuing reception of English mercantile statutes. This, however, generated fresh uncertainty about what counted as mercantile law and which English statutes were to be received. More than a century would pass before Parliament cut that knot in 1993, when the Application of English Law Act specified which English statutes applied here and on what terms.¹³

19. These legal developments were born out of practical necessity. A common and ascertainable body of law supplied the shared language for the ordinary and commercial life of this society: inhabitants could order their affairs by reference to known rules, merchants could contract with confidence, and disputes could be decided by law, rather than by status, force or private influence. Singapore’s population has grown from 10,683¹⁴ in 1824 to more than six million today,¹⁵ while international merchandise trade has risen from $11.4 million¹⁶ to nearly $1.4 trillion in 2025.¹⁷

20. Law alone did not produce that transformation. Geography, political choices, and human effort all played decisive roles. But none of those advantages could have been fully realised without confidence that agreements would be enforced, property protected and disputes resolved by known standards. This is the first illustration of my central proposition: that the formal quality of legal certainty generated the practical good of trust, and trust enabled our national and commercial flourishing.

B. Independent and effective courts: making legal rights real

21. Legal certainty, however, only takes us only so far. Rules have little practical value unless there is a credible institution capable of applying them authoritatively and impartially. If certainty fixes the content of the law, the courts determine the law’s meaning in practical terms and in a way that makes it possible for people to rely on that understanding.

22. Before the Second Charter, Singapore did not even have legally constituted courts.¹⁸ The Charter established a Court of Judicature, but its survival was not assured. In 1830, the East India Company, plagued by financial deficits, abolished much of its administrative structure, including the offices of the Governor of the Straits Settlements and his Resident Councillors. Because the Second Charter referred to the Governor and the Resident Councillors sitting as judges, Governor Fullerton concluded that the abolition of those offices signified a “withdrawal” of the judges and accordingly closed the Courts.¹⁹

23. For two years, the settlement was without a functioning judicial establishment. The resulting uproar – led not least by merchants who clearly understood what was at stake – eventually forced the courts open again.²⁰ The merchants knew that trade could not flourish for long if promises were unenforceable, and their clamour reflected the stark reality that formal legal rights produce practical confidence only when an effective judiciary can give them force.

24. The process of building an autonomous judiciary continued well beyond the colonial period. Even after Singapore achieved independence in 1965, our courts remained part of the wider Malaysian judicial structure, and final appeals continued to lie to the Privy Council.²¹ It was only in 1994 that a permanent Court of Appeal became Singapore’s final appellate court, following the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. For the first time, Singapore’s Judiciary stood entirely on its own.²²

25. But gaining judicial independence was not the end point. The practical value of the Courts depended also on their being competent, effective and responsive to the disputes before them. That functional logic continues to shape our courts today. Two brief examples, both signalled in that same inaugural address as Chief Justice that I have already referred to, illustrate how we have tailored our processes to achieve just outcomes:²³

First, family disputes often arise from fractured relationships that must continue after litigation, especially where divorced parents must raise a child together. A judgment can determine custody, maintenance or asset division, but cannot by itself repair trust or reduce the emotional harm of conflict. This is why we established the Family Justice Courts and adopted therapeutic justice as our guiding philosophy.²⁴ Mediation, counselling, multidisciplinary support and calibrated judicial intervention seek to deliver justice while reducing the destructive effects of prolonged litigation.²⁵
Second, we established the Singapore International Commercial Court to meet the needs of complex cross-border disputes. Its international bench and bespoke procedures draw, where appropriate, from litigation, arbitration and from common law and civil law practice.²⁶ In just over a decade, the SICC has become one of the world’s leading commercial courts and has contributed to the transnational system of commercial justice in diverse ways, including through its collaboration in establishing the Bahrain International Commercial Court. It illustrates the same point: institutions must evolve to ensure that the rule of law remains effective in changing conditions.

26. This historical arc shows our progression from establishing the Judiciary, to solidifying its institutional independence, and finally to strengthening its ability to respond effectively to increasingly varied disputes and extending our work to the wider region. At each stage, the courts strived to serve practical ends by converting rules into enforceable rights, enabling peaceful adjudication, and sustaining confidence that disputes would be resolved impartially and appropriately.

C. Accountability and equality: ensuring that the law applies to all

27. The third part of the architecture is the equal subjection of all persons and institutions to the law. This is vital because the staying power of the law lies in its ability to provide a common and trusted framework for all. The principle that no one is above the law affirms the equal standing of all before the legal order, and accountability ensures that those who exercise public or private power remain answerable to the law. This is essential to building and maintaining public confidence in, and securing the legitimacy of, the law. The framework of rules and courts that we have built will come to naught if some are able to operate beyond effective legal control and equality is widely perceived as being formal rather than real.

28. Singapore’s struggle against secret societies provides an early illustration. While they offered some social support, some developed into criminal engaged in extortion, kidnapping, robbery and murder,²⁷ and came to operate a quasi-feudal system beyond the protection of the law. Victims and witnesses would not testify for fear of reprisals. The ordinary criminal process was thus defeated by the emergence of conclaves of private power in which the law could not effectively rule.²⁸ This was a striking demonstration of lawlessness destroying liberty.

29. The Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act authorised exceptional measures, including detention without trial, to confront that problem. Such powers might sit uneasily with our presumptive expectation that guilt should be established at trial. But the relevant choice was not between an ideal trial process and preventive detention under otherwise normal conditions. The conditions needed for the ordinary process to function had themselves been undermined. The question was whether the State could restore the conditions in which the law was capable of functioning at all.

30. But the power to restore those conditions could not itself be placed beyond the law. The rule of law requires both sufficient authority to restore public order and legal limits to prevent that authority from itself becoming arbitrary. The two organisations are not inconsistent; even exceptional powers remain powers subject to the law. And the courts must be prepared to enforce the boundaries that Parliament has set.

31. This was what the Court of Appeal did in Tan Seet Eng.²⁹ The appellant had been detained for involvement in a global match-fixing syndicate. But the grounds initially supplied for the detention did not explain how his conduct threatened public safety, peace or good order in Singapore, as the CLTPA required. The Court of Appeal held the detention unlawful and ordered his release.

32. Following our decision, the Executive issued a fresh order on substantially fuller grounds³⁰ and, of its own accord, reviewed the detention of three others allegedly connected with the syndicate whose cases were not even before us. Their orders were revoked and they were released.³¹ The Government complied not only in form but in spirit, and not only in the case we decided but in cases that were not even before us. This is accountability and proper governance under law in action.

33. Our approach to corruption reflects the same concern with equality and accountability. Corruption allows money, office or influence to displace lawful entitlement. It tells the ordinary person that permits, services or fair treatment may depend on access to private power. In doing so, it creates two legal orders – one for those willing and able to pay, and another for everyone else – and this is highly corrosive of public trust.

34. Corruption was rampant during the colonial period, in part because the Anti-Corruption Branch within the Criminal Investigation Department and the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance proved ineffective. In October 1951, for example, a consignment of 1,800 pounds of opium worth $400,000 was hijacked, and senior police officers were found to be involved. Yet, many were not prosecuted because the Branch was unable to gather sufficient evidence.³²

35. The decisive turn came after Singapore attained self-government in 1959. The Prevention of Corruption Act, enacted in 1960, conferred enhanced powers of arrest, search and seizure, imposed a legal obligation to provide information, and allowed for a penalty equal to the gratification received.³³ The Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act³⁴ later strengthened the regime by enabling the confiscation of benefits and requiring persons convicted of corruption offences who hold assets disproportionate to their known income to provide a satisfactory explanation.³⁵

36. The effectiveness of this framework has also been shaped by judicial interpretation. The PCA must be applied in a principled and fair manner to give effect to its purpose. In Lum Hsien Loong Kenneth,³⁶ the Court reiterated that custodial sentences are presumptively the norm where the public-service rationale is engaged. But, as I emphasised in Romel,³⁷ the law does not draw a rigid line between public and private-sector corruption. Corruption by a public servant will often be more damaging to the public interest, and therefore more serious, but that will not invariably be so.

37. The application is therefore flexible, but the purpose is clear: to prevent wealth, office or influence from placing anyone beyond the effective reach of the law. Our anti-corruption jurisprudence thus offers one of the clearest illustrations of a legal order that delivers in practice, not merely in form, the equal subjection of all to the law. That in turn has been critical to sustaining institutional integrity and public trust.

38. Secret societies and corruption threatened Singapore in different ways, but each exposed the same underlying danger. When coercion, intimidation or private advantage prevents the law from operating effectively, the promise of equality rings hollow and confidence in the legal order is diminished. The response in each case therefore illustrates the central thesis of my lecture. The rule of law may rest on a formal architecture, but that does not make it “thin”. Properly construed and constituted, that architecture has secured public order, equal citizenship, accountability in the exercise of power, and confidence that the law – not force or favour – will prevail. And this was just what a small, resource-poor, and new, nation needed to secure its survival.

39. That last point, about confidence in the law over force or favour, assumes particular importance against the broader decline in public confidence in institutions that have been seen in many societies. Singapore , by contrast, continues to enjoy exceptionally high levels of confidence in its Judiciary and in its public instutitions. A quite recent New York Times article reported that Singapore is one of just five jurisdictions in the world in which public confidence in the judiciary stood at 85% or more.³⁸ I do not suggest that this can be attributed to any single cause. But I believe it stems, at least in part, from the emphasis that we have placed on accountability and the even-handed enforcement of the law, without regard to status or influence in developing our conception of the rule of law. And I also believe that has contributed significantly to sustaining public trust in our judiciary and other public institutions. And as a corollary, to varying degrees, the general decline of such trust that is being experienced in many other jurisdictions could perhaps be traced to a different conception of the rule of law that might appear more muscular, without necessarily being geared to delivering practical justice outcomes that serve the polity as a whole.

D. What the Singapore experience shows

40. Let me draw the historical argument together by returning to the “why” question with which I began. Singapore’s experience suggests that the rule of law matters because of what its institutions make possible. As a young, diverse society built around trade, we needed a common framework within which people could live and transact despite differences of origin, language and custom. To ensure that this framework was capable of fulfilling its intended purposes, we needed to build and refine institutions capable of resolving disputes peacefully and authoritatively. And to shore up public confidence in these laws and institutions, restraints on the exercise of public and private power were crucial. The rule of law supplied the order within which individuals could exercise their freedoms, pursue their interests and participate in a common social, economic and political life.

41. This is my answer to the “why” question. The rule of law has provided the framework of ordered freedom within our society, within which our society has been able to function and flourish. And the answer to the “what” question, at least from a historical perspective, is that it has done this by providing legal certainty, independent and effective courts, and equality and accountability before the law.

III. Renewing the rule of law for modern conditions

42. But the same functional account that explains the value of the institutions we have built also prevents us from treating them as complete. Changes in commerce, deepening global interdependence and technological innovation have altered how businesses operate, how disputes arise and are adjudicated, and how people encounter and interact with the legal system. If the rule of law is judged by what it delivers, we must now ask what threatens its capacity to deliver justice, trust, order and freedom, and how it must evolve in response.

43. I want to focus on four potentially important contemporary challenges.

First, growing complexity and escalating legal costs that may place the protection of the law beyond ordinary reach, threatening access to justice, equality and confidence in the legal process.
Second, the emergence of borderless problems that expose the limits of legal systems acting only within their own territories, threatening certainty and accountability across legal orders.
Third, pressures on the sustainability of legal practice that threaten the human capacity needed to deliver competent, accessible and ethical justice.
Fourth, generative artificial intelligence that promises greater accessibility and efficiency, but may undermine transparency, accountability and trust if it is used without care.

44. In the light of these challenges, the answer to the “why” question might remain substantially the same, but the answer to the “what” question may not. The commitments to certainty, equality, accountability and effective justice may endure, but how they are secured in practice must respond to changing conditions and new threats. And it is in this sense that our conception of the rule of law might have to evolve.

A. Complexity and access to justice

45. Let me begin with access to justice. As I observed in the same inaugural address as Chief Justice, access to meaningful justice must be a realistic end for all.³⁹ Yet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has reported that two-thirds of the world’s population lack meaningful access to justice and that, in OECD countries alone, some 600 million people cannot resolve their everyday justice problems.⁴⁰ That exposes the gap between formal availability and practical reality. The rule of law does not deliver justice unless people can actually invoke the law. A persistent deficit in access to justice is the very antithesis of what I say the core purpose of the rule of law is, which is to deliver practical justice for society.

46. There are at least three broad dimensions to the barriers that impede access to justice.⁴¹

The first is physical. For those living in poorly connected areas, distance from courts and legal services may itself be a substantial obstacle. This is admittedly less of a concern for us in Singapore.⁴²
The second concerns resources. Many people cannot afford legal representation and may therefore struggle to understand or vindicate their legal rights.
The third concerns legal literacy. Some may not recognise that the problem they face has a legal dimension or that the law can provide a remedy. Others may understand that they have a legal issue but lack the knowledge or assistance needed to navigate their way to a solution effectively.

47. To these familiar barriers, we must add the growing complexity of modern disputes.⁴³ Cases today may involve immense documentary records, multiple expert witnesses, technical subject matter and proceedings extending over years. We once heard a case concerning the manufacture of synthetic diamonds in the Court of Appeal that was so technically complex that we needed a technology tutorial over a period of three half-days just to understand the domain to enable us to consider the application of the relevant legal principles.⁴⁴ Digital life also produces emails, instant messages, recordings and metadata in volumes that can obscure rather than illuminate the real issues. Such complexity can also impair adjudication itself, without necessarily aiding the search for truth.

48. Complexity also affects the articulation and accessibility of the law. An empirical study showed that the median length of judgments of the General Division of the High Court had more than doubled from 2003 to 2023⁴⁵, and I don't say that with any pride. Some of the law students among you — particularly those who have encountered these judgments on a reading list — may feel that the increase has been even greater, though, I understand, many of you may not feel it, thanks to your increasing familliarity and reliance on AI tools! But the trend reflects, at least in part, the increasing complexity of the disputes that come before the courts. It also burdens those who must find, understand and apply the law. If only the best-resourced parties can bear that burden, equality before the law is weakened, and the certainty and confidence that the rule of law is meant to secure are put at risk.

49. Complexity may also arise from the processes through which disputes are required to be resolved. I have previously spoken about the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer and employment relationships, where claims are typically modest, and where the cost of pursuing arbitration individually, and the time it takes, outweighs any potential returns to such an extent that it is in effect a denial of justice. The dispute resolution process if not proportionately designed can itself become an obstacle to justice.⁴⁶

50. Singapore’s response has been a collective one involving the Government, the profession and the Courts. Legal aid schemes assist those who cannot afford representation.⁴⁷ The profession contributes through pro bono service. And the Courts have sought to simplify procedures, expand digital services and strengthen public outreach, including through the establishment of the Access to Justice Programme Office, now Division, in 2023. We have also strived, as much as possible, to use plain, accessible English instead of Latin phrases when explaining our decisions. Each of these efforts seeks to close the gap between the formal purpose of the law, and the practical ways in which we achieve it.

51. But we should not assume that making inherited processes more efficient will always or necessarily be enough. Some disputes may require a more fundamental redesign of process. In appropriate cases, proportionality may call for representative sampling of the evidence, simplified adjudication for lower-value claims, protocols that narrow the issues for determination, the use of dispute boards, or technological assistance in identifying the questions that truly matter. The objective is not speed for its own sake. It is to design processes that remain fair and rigorous, but are better aligned with the nature, value and complexity of the dispute.

52. None of this entails a lowering of standards. Fairness, accuracy and due process remain indispensable. But they must be pursued through institutions and processes that remain genuinely accessible to those whom they exist to serve. A renewed conception of the rule of law must therefore recognise practical accessibility and procedural proportionality as essential aspects.

B. Borderless problems and principled convergence

53. The second challenge arises because many of the problems confronting legal systems today no longer respect national boundaries. The parties, the conduct, the evidence and the effects involved in a dispute may be spread across several jurisdictions. No single system may therefore be able to address all the causes and consequences of a transnational problem by acting alone.

54. This matters because legal certainty within each domestic system may not produce certainty across borders. The same conduct may attract conflicting consequences, similarly situated parties may be treated differently, and businesses may face overlapping or contradicting obligations. Harmful conduct may also escape effective regulation if it happens to fall between jurisdictional schools. Fragmentation may therefore weaken the very goods that the rule of law is meant to secure: certainty, equality and accountability. For those operating internationally, those values must be sustained not only within national borders, but across them.

55. Consider two examples.

First, artificial intelligence already raises questions of responsibility, attribution, transparency, ownership and compensation. A system may be designed in one jurisdiction, trained on data drawn from many others, deployed through a global platform and cause harm elsewhere. Rules developed solely from the perspective of one territory may leave gaps, impose conflicting obligations or fail to identify where the responsibility properly lies.
Second, climate change makes the problem still more vivid. Emissions generated in one place contribute cumulatively to harm elsewhere. Litigation may involve contested science, probabilistic causation and consequences unfolding across generations and borders. Proceedings brought by survivors of Typhoon Rai in the Philippines, alleging that a multinational energy company contributed to climate-related harm,⁴⁸ illustrate the mismatch between territorially bounded legal systems and causation said to operate across borders. For a small, low-lying island state like Singapore, the development of coherent legal responses to climate risk is not a theoretical concern, but an intensely practical one with existential implications.

56. The answer does not lie in seeking complete uniformity. Legal systems differ in their histories, their constitutional structures, their social priorities and their institutional capacities and constraints. A single global code imposed without regard to those differences would be neither realistic nor just. Convergence, I suggest, should be a bridge, not a bulldozer: enabling different systems to communicate and cooperate while preserving what is distinct and legitimate in each.

57. What is needed is a principled effort to reduce unnecessary divergence, identify areas of common ground and ensure that the domestic legal development takes account of the transnational character of the problem. Convergence may occur through treaties, model laws, recognition and enforcement frameworks, shared procedural standards, judicial dialogue or the gradual emergence of common principles. These mechanisms do not eliminate legitimate differences. They help restore predictability, close gaps in accountability and create workable means of resolving disputes that no longer fit neatly within a single legal order.

58. Singapore has sought to contribute to this process of principled convergence both by helping to develop international norms and by strengthening cooperation between legal institutions. Our diplomats have played leading roles in the former: Ambassador Tommy Koh presided over the negotiations that produced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while Ambassador Rena Lee led negotiations for the Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction.⁴⁹ For Singapore, these efforts have particular importance. As a trading nation dependent on open and stable sea lanes, we have a direct interest in a global commons governed by coherent and commonly accepted rules.

59. Another part of Singapore’s contribution to this effort has been the Asian Business Law Institute, or ABLI, which celebrated its tenth anniversary last week. The ABLI promotes the convergence of Asian business laws by identifying areas of undesirable divergence between legal systems and developing practical principles and frameworks to reduce those differences. Its work has covered areas such as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, cross-border data transfers and business restructuring and insolvency.⁵⁰ In this way, ABLI exemplifies the form of principled convergence I have described: promoting greater coherence where this can support cross-border commerce while respecting legitimate differences between legal systems.

60. Regional legal cooperation performs a related function. The ASEAN Law Association brings together judges, practitioners and academics from diverse legal traditions within this region. And the Council of ASEAN Chief Justices has a busy agenda of collaborative projects while also supporting cooperation in areas featuring transnational issues or interests, such as insolvency, intellectual property, family justice, court technology and climate justice. In 2025, for instance, the ASEAN Chief Justices adopted a Model Framework for Communication and Cooperation Between ASEAN Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings, translating a general commitment to judicial dialogue into practical channels for courts dealing with the same regional insolvency proceeding to work together.⁵¹ Bilateral and multilateral judicial exchanges complement these efforts by deepening understanding, exposing judges to alternative approaches and building the trust needed when disputes and institutional challenges cross borders.

61. Certainty, equality, accountability and effective dispute resolution remain critical principles. But where conduct, harm and legal relationships cross borders, domestic systems usually cannot secure those goods alone. The rule of law must therefore encompass the capacity of legal systems to communicate, cooperate and, where principle and necessity require and permit, to converge, so that fragmentation does not defeat those values in practice. Just as the Second Charter of Justice supplied a common legal foundation for commerce two centuries ago, principled convergence across borders can provide a measure of coherence for commerce and public life in today’s highly interconnected and interdependent world.

C. A sustainable profession and institutional capacity

62. The third challenge concerns the people through whom the legal system is brought to life. Lawyers advise and represent those who invoke the law and they assist courts in reaching sound decisions. They therefore form part of the institutional machinery of the rule of law. If the system cannot sustain a sufficient pool of capable lawyers, its ability to deliver effective and accessible justice will erode. The sustainability of legal practice is therefore not merely a matter of individual wellbeing or of good firm management. It bears directly on the capacity of the legal system to perform its public functions.

63. That institutional capacity might be under some strain. At this year’s Mass Call, roughly a third of those surveyed indicated that they considered themselves likely to leave the profession within three years.⁵² It is sometimes said that this reflects a diminished resilience among young lawyers. I do not share that view. The pressures they face differ in important respects from those of their seniors: disputes have become more complex, practice has become more commercialised, and technology has steadily erased the boundary between work and personal life. These pressures can impair judgment, weaken professional formation and drive talented people away from practice in an environment where they are not short of options. This bears directly on the vitality and accessibility of the justice system, if it emerges as a real consequence.

64. If young lawyers do leave in significant numbers, the consequences will extend well beyond the firms from which they depart. A shrinking Bar means fewer lawyers available to meet the needs of those requiring legal assistance, a shallower pool from which future leaders and judges may be drawn, and greater strain on those who remain. What might begin as a problem of retention may become a rule-of-law problem: legal rights may continue to exist in form, but the human capacity needed to uphold and enforce them will have been diminished.

65. There is also an ethical dimension. Environments dominated by urgency, billing pressures and relentless demands may produce “ethical fading”, as immediate pressures crowd out professional judgment and standards.⁵³

66. Again, the response needs to be collective. This is why we established the Future of the Legal Profession Committee, or the FLPC. It is unique because it is co-chaired by three senior figures representing three different groups: by my colleague Justice Hri Kumar Nair, by Deputy Attorney-General Valerie Thean and by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Law Luke Goh, and it is guided by the Future of the Legal Profession Steering Committee, which the Chief Justice co-leads with the Minister for Law. Crucially, its membership is drawn from across the legal ecosystem: the Government, the Judiciary, law firms, in-house counsel, academia and professional bodies. That breadth reflects a simple point. The sustainability of the legal profession is not the responsibility of any one institution; it is a responsibility of the system as a whole, and a key element of a vibrant and well-functioning legal system.

D. Artificial intelligence and accountable justice

67. The final challenge I will touch on today is Gen AI. These systems can process, organise, summarise and translate vast quantities of material with remarkable speed. Properly used, they may reduce costs, make complex legal materials easier to navigate, and free judges and lawyers to focus on tasks that demand human judgment. A self-represented litigant may better understand both the case against her and the case she wishes to advance, while a judge may more readily identify the evidence and issues on which the real controversy turns.

68. But the risks bear just as directly on certainty and trust. Gen AI can produce confident but false answers, fabricated authorities and inaccurate summaries. Its outputs may reflect hidden assumptions, incomplete information or unreliable data. A recent case from India provides a stark example. In deciding objections arising from a property dispute, a trial judge relied on several apparently authoritative precedents that did not exist and appeared to have been generated by AI. The Supreme Court of India regarded this not merely as an error of reasoning, but as a matter bearing directly on the integrity of the adjudicatory process.⁵⁴

69. Add to this the fact that the internal operation of many systems may be opaque, even to those who develop or deploy them. If such outputs are relied on without adequate verification, legal outcomes may become less accurate, less reliable and less pertinent, and as a consequence, public confidence in the administration of justice may be weakened. Opacity is especially troubling in adjudication because it threatens accountability. Judicial authority rests not only on the outcome reached, but on the reasons given for it. Parties must be able to understand the basis of a decision, challenge errors and seek review. Moreover, a judge’s duty to give reasons is the primary way through which she accounts to the public at large for the exercise of her judicial power. A court cannot discharge these responsibilities by delegating judgment to a system whose contributions cannot be exposed, tested and defended.

70. The critical distinction may lie between assistance and responsibility. AI may, in general, help to identify, organise and test material. It may support research, translation and accessibility. But the judge must remain responsible for the decision, the lawyer for the submission, and the institution for the system it chooses to deploy. Human users must understand the limits of the technology, verify its outputs and remain able to explain and defend the reasoning that is ultimately deployed.

71. The implications of this for our conception of the rule of law are evidently significant. Its formal core does not change: legal decision-making must remain lawful, independent, reasoned and accountable. But what those requirements demand must be understood in the light of new technological conditions. Where AI materially shapes legal advice, advocacy or adjudication, it is not enough that a human somehow remains involved in a formal way. There must be meaningful human judgment and responsibility that can be clearly identified. AI does not require us to abandon the formal conception of the rule of law, but to renew it so that its practical promise — certainty, accountability, effective justice and public trust — is preserved in the technological age.

72. Let me close this section by adding that this is such a large subject that the whole of my next lecture in this series will be delivered in Brisbane next month, and it will grapple with the potential lines and limits of incorporating AI into the justice system.

IV. Our responsibilities

73. The rule of law has always been, for Singapore, a matter of vital concern. Our survival, as a commercial entrepôt and later as a vulnerable young nation, depended in no small measure on the strength of our legal system. That remains true today. And if, as I have suggested, the rule of law is ultimately to be judged by what its institutions deliver, then each of us bears responsibility for ensuring that those institutions continue to deliver justice, certainty, equality and trust under changing conditions.

74. Lawyers are central to this enterprise. They are not merely representatives of their clients, but stewards of the system of justice. Their choices — the claims they advance, the issues they contest and the procedures they invoke — can either promote or impede the fair and efficient administration of justice. In one judgment, I described lawyers as ministers in the temple of justice⁵⁵ to capture the wider responsibility that they bear: the rule of law just cannot operate properly if those who invoke and administer it are themselves wanting in honesty, judgment or professional responsibility.

75. That responsibility has both an immediate and a longer-term dimension. At one level, in the conduct of disputes, lawyers should resist tactical complexity that serves only to increase cost or delay; they should guide clients towards the process best suited to the dispute; and they should work to narrow the issues and then present the material candidly. But beyond this, stewardship also requires lawyers to help sustain the profession itself. On them falls the task of transmitting professional standards through supervision and example, through treating colleagues — especially junior lawyers — with fairness, respect and care. Each generation must accept responsibility not only for the cases before it, but also for the legal system that it will leave behind.

76. Academics contribute in an equally important way. They bring theoretical and doctrinal discipline and analytical rigour to aid the work of judges and advocates. And by studying comparative and regional developments, they help identify where principled convergence may be possible and provide the intellectual architecture for reform. The work of ABLI, which I referred to earlier, illustrates this well. Academics have been integral to its work, collaborating with judges and practitioners in comparative research and in developing principles and frameworks for legal convergence. It is worth recalling, in this connection, that the concept of therapeutic justice was coined and initially developed by academics.⁵⁶ The work of updating our working model of the rule of law should be the work of many hands.

77. And then there are the students. You are the future custodians of Singapore’s legal institutions. That responsibility can begin even before you enter practice. Through legal clinics and pro bono service, you can encounter the distance that sometimes exists between rights on paper and justice in practice, while cultivating the empathy and sense of public responsibility needed to close that distance. You should participate in regional networks and opportunities, including those close to home, such as the ASEAN Law Association Youth Wing, the Virtual Training Marketplace and the ASEAN Law Moot. These experiences broaden your comparative perspectives and foster the relationships and habits of cooperation needed to address problems that do not respect national borders. Resist the instinct to regard any legal system, including our own, as complete in itself. Learn from other traditions, test assumptions and remain willing to ask how our institutions might better serve those who depend on them.

78. Above all, begin now to cultivate the integrity and judgment that the law will demand of you. Professional character is not acquired only upon admission to the Bar; it is formed through your appreciation of and devotion to the mission of the law, and by the choices you will make in your approach to your education, from the honesty of your work, to the care with which you use new technologies, the respect you show to others and your willingness to take responsibility for mistakes.

V. Conclusion

79. Let me conclude by returning to the two questions with which I began: why does the rule of law matter, and what does it require? My answer to the first is ultimately a practical one. The rule of law matters because it provides the framework of ordered freedom within which our society has been able to function and flourish.

80. Viewed from that vantage point, Singapore’s dividend from the rule of law has been remarkable. Over two centuries, we have inherited a legal order, and then progressively developed it into one that has supported social stability, societal cohesion, commercial confidence, effective government and the peaceful resolution of disputes. No single institution, and certainly no single legal principle, can account for Singapore’s development. But the practical effectiveness of our approach to the rule of law may help explain why we continue to perform strongly in international assessments of legal institutions and why, as I noted earlier, public confidence in our Judiciary and our institutions remain high. In the World Justice Project’s 2025 Rule of Law Index, for example, Singapore ranked 16th overall out of 143 jurisdictions, and within the top ten globally, for absence of corruption, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice.⁵⁷ These measures are not ends in themselves, nor do they establish that our work is complete. But they are consistent with the proposition I have advanced today: judged by what it has enabled our legal order to deliver, the rule of law has served Singapore extraordinarily well, and it may be misleading to describe that conception as a “thin” one.

81. And that brings me to the “what” question. The very reasons that explain the importance of the rule of law also explain why our conception of what it requires cannot be cast in stone. What it requires in any society will necessarily be shaped by that society’s political, social and historical circumstances. In Singapore, our conception of the rule of law has placed weight not only on the protection of individual rights, but also on the conditions that enable society as a whole to flourish. This is reflected, for example, in the balance I described earlier between individual liberty and the need to preserve the conditions of public order in which the law can function effectively. It is in this sense that our understanding of the rule of law has a communitarian dimension.

82. This may, in turn, have implications for the distribution and exercise of public power. Securing these conditions may, in some circumstances, call for a strong and effective Executive capable of acting decisively in the interests of the community. But this need not be antithetical to the rule of law. The critical point is that executive power, however strong, remains constrained by the law. These communitarian and institutional dimensions of our conception of the rule of law raise larger questions that I will return to, and develop more fully, in the third lecture of this series, at the Global Rule of Law Conference here in Singapore in November.

83. The contemporary challenges I have considered today illustrate, from a different angle, the same broader proposition that what the rule of law requires must respond to the conditions in which it operates. If complexity and cost prevent people from vindicating their rights, the promise of equal justice is diminished. If transnational problems escape effective legal control because our legal systems remain confined within national boundaries, then certainty, accountability and the ability to secure desired and shared goals are weakened. If the legal profession cannot sustain the human capacity on which it depends, effective justice is itself put at risk. And if technology comes to influence legal outcomes in ways that cannot be explained, verified or attributed to a responsible human actor, the accountability on which public trust depends will be compromised. These are not signs that we have misconceived the rule of law. They are reasons to ask, continually, what those foundations require if they are to continue serving their purpose in the world as it is.

84. We have built our legal order over the two hundred years since the Second Charter of Justice. But that legal order was never static. On the contrary, its developments have been the product of discipline, vigilance, and the ceaseless resolve of generations through the years to renew and adapt our laws and institutions to serve the ends of justice. It is in that vein that I ask you to have faith in the law – in its central importance to the story of our nation, and in its potential to do good. The law has force only because we believe that it should. And if the rule of law is to remain more than ideas on a page, it is up to us to cherish it, to protect it, and to strengthen it. That is the inheritance we have received, and it is our responsibility to enhance it and then to pass it on in the best shape possible! Thank you very much.

^{(1) Sundaresh Menon CJ, Response at the Opening of the Legal Year 2013 and Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice (4 January 2013) available at: https://sal.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CJ-OLY-Welcome-Reference.pdf at para 11.}

^{(2) Sundaresh Menon, “The Rule of Law: The Path to Exceptionalism” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 413, available at https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive/ctl/eFirstSALPDFJournalView/mid/495/ArticleId/1156/Citation/JournalsOnlinePDF at para 7.}

^{(3) Lord Sales, “What is the rule of law and why does it matter”, available at https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/speech_Lord_Sales_121224_b52c07f7e8.pdf.}

^{(4) Lord Sales, “What is the rule of law and why does it matter”, available at https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/speech_Lord_Sales_121224_b52c07f7e8.pdf at p 2.}

^{(5) Lee Hsien Loong, Senior Minister, Speech at the Launch of the “25 Years of Legal Reform in Singapore” Book Series, (28 July 2026) Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, available at:} ^{https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/sm-lee-hsien-loong-at-the-launch-of-the-25-years-of-legal-reform-in-singapore-book-series}^.

^{(6) See Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896); Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954).}

^{(7) Lee Hsien Loong, Senior Minister, Speech at the Launch of the “25 Years of Legal Reform in Singapore” Book Series (28 July 2026), Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, available at: https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/sm-lee-hsien-loong-at-the-launch-of-the-25-years-of-legal-reform-in-singapore-book-series.}

^{(8) Tan Seng Kee v Attorney-General and other appeals [2022] 1 SLR 1347; see Lee Hsien Loong, “National Day Rally 2022” (21 August 2022), section on “Section 377A”, Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, available at https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/national-day-rally-2022-english, where then-Prime Minister Lee said “following the most recent judgement in the Court of Appeal, the Minister for Law and the Attorney General have advised that in a future court challenge, there is a significant risk of s377A being struck down, on the grounds that it breaches the Equal Protection provision in the Constitution. We have to take that advice seriously. It would be unwise to ignore the risk, and do nothing.”}

^{(9) Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “The Development of Singapore Law” (Butterworths, 1990) at p 34.}

^{(10) Kevin Y L Tan, “A Short Legal and Constitutional History of Singapore” in “Essays in Singapore Legal History” (edited by Kevin Y L Tan) at p 30.}

^{(11) Regina v Willans (1858) 3 Ky 16.}

^{(12) Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “From Foundation to Legacy: The Second Charter of Justice” (Singapore Academy of Law, 2006) at pp 7 to 10.}

^{(13) Section 3 clarifies that the common law of England, so far as it was part of the law of Singapore immediately before 12 November 1993, continues to be part of Singapore law, so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and subject to modifications as circumstances may require. Section 4 states that English enactments in the First Schedule apply in Singapore, subject to amendments specified in the Second Schedule, while section 5 clarifies that the Act is exhaustive in setting out the English enactments which apply to Singapore.}

^{(14) Ang Seow Leng, “Head Count: The history of census-taking in Singapore” (2020) BiblioAsia, available at: https://biblioasia.nlb.gov.sg/all-sections/vol-15-issue-4-jan-mar-2020-head-count-history.}

^{(15) Available at: https://www.population.gov.sg/our-population/population-trends/overall-population.}

^{(16) Mavis Chionh, “The Development of the Court System” in “Essays in Singapore Legal History” (edited by Kevin Y L Tan) at p 101; see also Jason Lim, “Chinese Merchants in Singapore and the China Trade, 1819–1959” (2011–2012) 5 Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies 79, available at researchgate.net/publication/316960399_Jason_Lim_'Chinese_Merchants_in_Singapore_and_the_China_Trade_1819-1959'_Chinese_Southern_Diaspora_Studies_Vol_5_2011-2012_pp_79-115/link/591a8478aca2722d7cfe91e4/download?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIiwicGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIn19 at pages 84 and 85.}

^{(17) Available at:} ^{https://www.singstat.gov.sg/infographics/singapore-international-trade}

^{(18) Kevin Y L Tan, “A Short Legal and Constitutional History of Singapore” in “Essays in Singapore Legal History” (edited by Kevin Y L Tan) at pp 31 and 32.}

^{(19) For financial reasons, the EIC decided to cut costs by abolishing much of its administrative structure: Mavis Chionh, “The Development of the Court System” in “Essays in Singapore Legal History” (edited by Kevin Y L Tan) at p 100.}

^{(20) Mavis Chionh, “The Development of the Court System” in “Essays in Singapore Legal History” (edited by Kevin Y L Tan) at pp 100 and 101.}

^{(21) Mavis Chionh, “The Development of the Court System” in “Essays in Singapore Legal History” (edited by Kevin Y L Tan) at pp 113 to 117.}

^{(22) Mavis Chionh, “The Development of the Court System” in “Essays in Singapore Legal History” (edited by Kevin Y L Tan) at p 116.}

^{(23) This was a priority when I was appointed Chief Justice. See for example, Sundaresh Menon CJ, Response at the Opening of the Legal Year 2013 and Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice (4 January 2013) available at: https://sal.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CJ-OLY-Welcome-Reference.pdf at paras 15, 16 and 33.}

^{(24) Justice Debbie Ong, “Today is a New Day”, address at Family Justice Courts Workplan 2020 (21 May 2020), available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/docs/default-source/news-docs/fjc-workplan-2020.pdf?sfvrsn=8b619dc0_0 at paras 35 to 52.}

^{(25) Justice Teh Hwee Hwee, “From Confrontation to Collaboration: A Decade in Transforming The Family Justice Paradigm” available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/justice-teh-hwee-hwee--keynote-address-delivered-at-the-family-conference-2024 at paras 10 to 16 and 21.}

^{(26) Sundaresh Menon CJ, “The Emerging Architecture of Transnational Commercial Justice”, opening address at the Singapore International Commercial Court Conference 2025 (15 January 2025), available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/chief-justice-sundaresh--opening-address-at-the-singapore-international-commercial-court-conference-2025 at paras 37 to 40.}

^{(27) Irene Lim, “Secret Societies in Singapore: Featuring the William Stirling Collection” (National Heritage Board, Singapore History Museum, 1999) at p 19.}

^{(28) Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill – Opening Speech by Assoc Prof Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim, Minister of State, Ministry of Home Affairs & Ministry of National Development, available at https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/media-detail/second-reading-of-the-criminal-law-temporary-provisions-amendment-bill-opening-speech-by-assoc-prof-muhammad-faishal-ibrahim-minister-of-state-ministry-of-home-affairs-ministry-of-national-development.}

^{(29) Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General [2016] 1 SLR 779.}

^{(30) Ministry of Home Affairs, “MHA Statement on Detention of Dan Tan Seet Eng”, press release (5 December 2015) at paras 3 and 5, available at https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/mha-statement-on-detention-of-dan-tan-seet-eng/.}

^{(31) Ministry of Home Affairs, “MHA Statement on Three Members of Match-fixing Syndicate Released from Detention and Placed on Police Supervision Orders”, press release (18 January 2016) at para 3, available at https://www.mha.gov.https://www.mha.gov.sg/media-room/newsroom/mha-statement-on-three-members-of-match-fixing-syndicate-released-from-detention-and-placed-on-police-supervision-orders/.}

^{(32) “The Journey – 60 Years of Fighting Corruption in Singapore” Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, 2012 at pp 16 to 18.}

^{(33) Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “The Development of Singapore Law” (Butterworths, 1990) at pp 239 and 240.}

^{(34) See now the Corruption, Drug-Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992.}

^{(35) Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “The Development of Singapore Law” (Butterworths, 1990) at p 240.}

^{(36) Lum Hsien Loong Kenneth v Public Prosecutor [2026] 3 SLR 1661 at [114].}

^{(37) Public Prosecutor v Syed Mostofa Romel [2015] 3 SLR 1166.}

^{(38) Adam Liptak, “Confidence in US Courts Plummets to Rate Far Below Peer Nations” (New York Times, 17 December 2024), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/17/us/gallup-poll-judiciary-courts.htmle.}

^{(39) Sundaresh Menon CJ, Response at the Opening of the Legal Year 2013 and Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice (4 January 2013) available at: https://sal.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CJ-OLY-Welcome-Reference.pdf at para 13.}

^{(40) OECD, “Making justice systems more effective and people centred: Advancing a responsive rule of law”, available at oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/11/making-justice-systems-more-effective-and-people-centred_d705c01f/e02fd90b-en.pdf at pp 8 and 12.}

^{(41) Sundaresh Menon CJ, “Technology and the Changing Face of Justice”, lecture delivered at the Negotiation and Conflict Management Group ADR Conference 2019, available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/docs/default-source/news-docs/ncmg---keynote-lecture.pdf at paras 11 to 27.}

^{(42) Nevertheless, we are working to bridge the physical gap by introducing touchpoints in our heartlands. For example, applications to enforce maintenance orders may be made at integrated service hubs such as ServiceSG@Our Tampines Hub and ServiceSG@One Punggol, without having to physically attend at the Family Justice Courts.}

^{(43) Sundaresh Menon CJ, “The Complexification of Disputes in the Digital Age” (Goff Lecture 2021), available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/docs/default-source/news-docs/goff-lecture-2021.pdf?sfvrsn=b62f9b82_2.}

^{(44) The case of IIa Technologies Pte Ltd v Element Six Technologies Ltd [2023] 1 SLR 987.}

^{(45) Lim How Khang, “An Empirical Study on Judgments Written by the Supreme Court Judges of Singapore” at p 15.}

^{(46) Sundaresh Menon CJ, “The Pursuit of Justice: Securing Trust in Arbitration”, Keynote address delivered at the SIAC Annual India Conference 2024, available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/chief-justice-sundaresh-menon--keynote-address-delivered-at-the-siac-annual-india-conference-2024 at paras 9 to 11.}

^{(47) Muhammad Taufiq bin Suraidi and Ryan David Nonis, “The Public Defender’s Office: Singapore’s Publicly-funded Criminal Defence Aid”, (2024) 36 SAcLJ 758.}

^{(48) Matt McGrath, “Shell Facing First UK Legal Claim over Climate Impacts of Fossil Fuels.” BBC News, 11 December 2025, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0r9p1ypyjyo.}

^{(49) Statement by Ambassador Tommy Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, at the Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Adoption and Opening for Signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, General Assembly, 8 December 2022 at paras 1 and 2; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Successful Conclusion of Negotiations Under Singapore’s Presidency on a new United Nations Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction” (5 March 2023).}

^{(50) Asian Business Law Institute, “Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments”, available at: https://abli.asia/abli-projects/asian-principles-for-the-recognition-and-enforcement-of-foreign-judgments/; ABLI, “Convergence of Laws and Frameworks for Cross-border Personal Data Transfers in Asia”, available at: https://abli.asia/abli-projects/convergence-of-data-privacy-laws-and-frameworks-for-cross-border-transfers-of-personal-data-in-asia/ ; ABLI, “Asian Principles of Business Restructuring”, available at: https://abli.asia/abli-projects/asian-principles-of-business-restructuring/.}

^{(51) Supreme Court, “12th Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ) Meeting: ASEAN Chief Justices launch regional model framework for cross-border insolvency” (Media Statement, 17 November 2025), available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/media-statement--12th-council-of-asean-chief-justices-%28cacj%29-meeting--asean-chief-justices-launch-regional-model-framework-for-cross-border-insolvency.}

^{(52) Sundaresh Menon CJ, “A Profession in Transition – Preparing and Supporting the Next Generation”, Speech at Mass Call Ceremony 2026 (20 April 2026), available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/chief-justice-sundaresh-menon--speech-at-mass-call-ceremony-2026 at para 11.}

^{(53) See Sundaresh Menon CJ, “The Future of the Legal Profession: A Shared Vision”, available at https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/news-and-resources/news/news-details/chief-justice-sundaresh-menon--opening-address-at-the-legal-profession-symposium-2025 at para 36.}

^{(54) “India’s top court angry after junior judge cites fake AI-generated orders”, BBC News (3 March 2026), available a}^t ^{https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c178zzw780xo}^.

^{(55) Re Tay Quan Li Leon [2022] 5 SLR 896 at [1].}

^{(56) David B. Wexler, “Creating a Therapeutic Justice Culture” [2021] SAL Prac 20, available at https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/SAL-Practitioner/Family-and-Personal-Law/ctl/eFirstSALPDFJournalView/mid/594/ArticleId/1637/Citation/JournalsOnlinePDF at paras 8 and 13.}

^{(57) World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index 2025: Singapore (2025), available at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2025/Singapore/.}

Topics: Conferences, forums, lectures and seminars

2026/09/02

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