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2. Redaction has not been done.

DISTRICT JUDGE SHAWN HO
18 OCTOBER 2024

IN THE STATE COURTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2024] SGDC 235

District Arrest Case No. 921296 of 2021 & Ors

Between

Public Prosecutor

And

Cher Sheue Pin Alverna

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT

[Criminal Law] — [Offences] — [Abetment of suicide]
[Criminal Law] — [Offences] — [Obstructing the course of justice]

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Public Prosecutor
v
Cher Sheue Pin Alverna

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District Arrest Case No. 921296 of 2021 & Ors

District Judge Shawn Ho

27, 30-31 October, 1-3, 6-7 November 2023

18-21 March, 8-12 July, 27 August, 13 September, 18 October 2024

18 October 2024

District Judge Shawn Ho

Introduction

1 The Accused, Mdm Cher Sheue Pin Alverna, had been convicted after trial of two charges of abetment by intentionally aiding suicide and obstructing the course of justice.

2 This judgment deals with the sentencing submissions and mitigation plea.

3 All things considered, the Accused was sentenced to 74 months' imprisonment.

4 I set out my reasons.

The parties' position on sentence***Prosecution's submissions on sentence***

5 The Prosecution sought the following sentence:¹

DAC No.	Sentence	Status
DAC 921296 2021 s 306 Penal Code	Upper half of the sentencing range for s 306	Consecutive
DAC 920605 2021 s 204A Penal Code	1 to 1.5 years	Consecutive

6 For the s 306 offence, the Accused's culpability was not low:

(a) First, while acts of intentional aiding can take many forms, the Accused's culpability can be seen by her actions of handling the Tank and IKEA bag at the material time. This in turn displayed intimate participation in his suicide efforts.²

(b) Second, the Accused's culpability must be understood against the backdrop of her knowledge, role, and interactions with Mr Wee leading up to 16 May 2020. She was no passive onlooker insofar as Mr Wee's suicide was concerned:

(i) Prior to 16 May 2020, the Accused was significantly involved in his suicide plans to the point

¹ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [2], [3], [5] and [10]-[12].

² Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(i)].

that she participated in a “trial run”. She told him to “die handsome”.³

(ii) The Accused’s actions of enlisting a doctor so that Mr Wee’s death could appear natural would also have encouraged him to take further steps in pursuing his suicide plans (ASOF at [30]).⁴

(iii) The Accused’s willingness and agreement to dispose of evidence of suicide on Mr Wee’s behalf goaded him to press on with his suicide plans.⁵

(iv) The Accused agreed to oversee Mr Wee’s funeral arrangements (ASOF at [27]-[29]). She even wrote a eulogy for Mr Wee (ASOF at [35]).⁶

(c) Third, when Mr Wee told the Accused that he was “commencing” his suicide plan on 16 May 2020, the Accused did not dissuade him. Instead, the Accused replied that she would see him “in another world”, i.e. “the afterlife after he passes away” (see also the ASOF at [42]).⁷

(d) Fourth, it was not the Accused’s case – given the defence of a bare denial that she ran at trial – that she assisted Mr Wee’s suicide out of some altruistic motivations or compassion that can

³ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(ii)(1)].

⁴ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(ii)(2)].

⁵ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(ii)(3)].

⁶ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(ii)(4)].

⁷ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(iii)].

be said to attenuate her culpability in any way. The Defence did not lead any evidence or alternative case in this regard.⁸

7 In *Public Prosecutor v Lim Tee Hian* [1991] 2 SLR(R) 393, the offender was convicted after trial of an offence under s 306 Penal Code (Cap 185, 1985 Rev Ed) and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.⁹

8 There was some limitation in relying on *Lim Tee Hian* as a precedent. The iteration of the offence that the offender in *Lim Tee Hian* was convicted of was different from the present provision. Unlike its predecessor, the present provision also contemplated a situation where the individual abetted *attempts* suicide.¹⁰

9 The upshot of this was that greater — if not overriding — significance would have been placed on an offender's culpability when sentencing under the previous iteration of the offence under s 306 of the Penal Code. Indeed, that overarching emphasis on the offender's culpability can be seen from the High Court's grounds of decision in *Lim Tee Hian*. That may not be warranted to the same extent, or necessarily appropriate, in the present situation, where the consequences flowing from an abettor's actions also acquires prominence in the sentencing equation.¹¹

10 For the s 204A offence, applying the Court of Appeal case of *Parthiban a/l Kanapathy v Public Prosecutor* [2021] 2 SLR 847:

⁸ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(iv)].

⁹ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(e)].

¹⁰ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(e)(i)].

¹¹ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(e)(ii)].

(a) The predicate offence is extremely serious – this concerns the Accused’s abetment and involvement in Mr Wee’s suicide. There was a degree of self-interest insofar as the Accused was also attempting to conceal her criminal liability. The maximum punishment of 10 years’ imprisonment underscored the severity of the offence.¹²

(b) The degree of persistence, premeditation, and sophistication was demonstrated by the following:¹³

(i) Prior to 16 May 2020, there were significant discussions between the Accused and Mr Wee as to how to get rid of the evidence.¹⁴

(ii) From the text messages, the Accused made material suggestions to improve Mr Wee’s plans, such as the fact that she should be the first one at the scene to find his body. That proactiveness underscored her complicity.¹⁵

(iii) The Accused undertook considerable efforts to bring these plans about. She instructed a third party, Mr Cheo,¹⁶ to remove evidence (the Tank). The Accused herself disposed of the IKEA bag, which was why it could not be retrieved by

¹² Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(a)].

¹³ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(b)].

¹⁴ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(b)(i)].

¹⁵ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(b)(ii)].

¹⁶ PW10.

investigation authorities. The Accused also lied to SSSgt Munira¹⁷ to conceal the Mr Wee's suicide.¹⁸

Mitigation plea

11 The Defence sought a global sentence of not more than 1 year's imprisonment because:¹⁹

- (a) The Accused is a first-time offender with no previous antecedent.
- (b) She is of a good character.
- (c) A criminal record has tainted her career, and a custodial sentence will destroy her career and family.
- (d) She is genuinely remorseful.
- (e) She has fully cooperated with the authorities.
- (f) There is no likelihood of recidivism in the present case.
- (g) Mr Wee in fact had planned his own suicide.

12 The Accused's daughters, aged 10 and 17, are entirely dependent on her for their upbringing, education, and emotional support. Her elderly parents, who require constant care, are also reliant on her. A custodial sentence would severely impact not only her life but also the well-being of her family.²⁰

¹⁷ PW16.

¹⁸ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(b)(iii)].

¹⁹ Mitigation Plea at [7]-[8], [79] and [109].

²⁰ Mitigation Plea at [31].

13 While the court has convicted the Accused, she had no intention of abetting Mr Wee’s suicide. The series of incidents that unfolded, as shown through the facts adduced during the trial, reflect her attempts to dissuade Mr Wee from taking his own life, and the court may have overlooked or misconstrued some key aspects.²¹

14 It was crucial to highlight that:

(a) Lack of criminal intent. The Accused did not intend to encourage or facilitate Mr Wee’s death. Her involvement stemmed from emotional manipulation by Mr Wee and a misguided sense of duty to honour his last wishes.²²

(b) Efforts to dissuade Mr Wee. The Accused repeatedly tried to dissuade Mr Wee from committing suicide by offering alternative solutions, including financial help and employment opportunities. She even suggested he seek medical help, further demonstrating her intent to save him.²³

(c) Mr Wee’s determination. Mr Wee’s determination to end his life was evident from his own preparations, including purchasing the nitrogen gas tank and orchestrating a detailed plan. The Accused was not the driving force behind these decisions.²⁴

(d) Emotional turmoil and confusion. The Accused’s state of mind during the incident must be considered. Her actions were not rational

²¹ Mitigation Plea at [36].

²² Mitigation Plea at [42(a)].

²³ Mitigation Plea at [42(b)].

²⁴ Mitigation Plea at [42(c)].

but influenced by the overwhelming emotional stress and confusion she experienced upon finding Mr Wee in a critical state.²⁵

(e) Her cooperation and honesty. When confronted by the authorities, the Accused admitted to her actions without hesitation, showing her willingness to cooperate despite her mental state at the time.²⁶

15 The Accused pleaded for leniency because the court opted not to believe, that as all scientific evidence shows memory does lapse over time. She felt aggrieved that the court chose instead to attribute to her a perfect and accurate memory upon which the conviction is built. She rightly or wrongly believed that this was a factor justifying leniency and the Defence Counsel were thus instructed to so plead.²⁷

16 The need for retributive justice was extremely low in the present case.²⁸ The offence was not the sort of offence which incited public outrage.²⁹

17 The principle of prevention applied only in very serious cases of dangerous or persistent offenders. Clearly, the Accused did not fall into this category of criminals.³⁰

18 Even if the Court was minded to impose a deterrent sentence, a deterrent

²⁵ Mitigation Plea at [42(d)].

²⁶ Mitigation Plea at [42(e)].

²⁷ Mitigation Plea at [46].

²⁸ Mitigation Plea at [58].

²⁹ Mitigation Plea at [58].

³⁰ Mitigation Plea at [60].

sentence need not take the form of a long custodial sentence.³¹

19 Although the principle of rehabilitation was highly persuasive and should apply in the present case, nonetheless, the facts of this case suggest that there was no further need to rehabilitate the Accused. She had been remanded in Changi Prison for 330 days. After she was released on bail, she continued to keep a clean record and has shown that she has learnt her lesson and will not reoffend. Rehabilitation has been achieved in this case.³²

20 The offences that the Accused was convicted of were not for profit or some evil motive.³³ She was not of wanton greed to profit by fraud on insurance companies and which involved the grievous loss of an innocent life but this case was the other way round.³⁴

My decision on sentence

Prescribed punishment

21 The prescribed punishment for s 306 of the Penal Code is imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years, and the offender shall also be liable to fine.

22 The prescribed punishment for s 204A of the Penal Code is imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years, or with fine, or with both.

23 An offence's statutory maximum sentence signals the gravity in which

³¹ Mitigation Plea at [63].

³² Mitigation Plea at [67].

³³ Mitigation Plea at [77(b)].

³⁴ Mitigation Plea at [77(c)].

Parliament views such offences. A sentencing judge ought to take this into account when determining precisely where the offender's conduct falls within the entire range of punishment set by Parliament: *Public Prosecutor v Kwong Kok Hing* [2008] 2 SLR(R) 684 at [44] (Benny Tan, *Assessing the Effectiveness of Sentencing Guideline Judgments in Singapore Issued Post-March 2013 and A Guide to Constructing Frameworks*, (2018) 30 SAcLJ 1004 at [46]).

24 The court should ensure that the full spectrum of sentences enacted by Parliament is carefully explored in determining the appropriate sentence, *viz.* Completeness principle (*Poh Boon Kiat v Public Prosecutor* [2014] 4 SLR 892 at [60]).

25 Claiming Trial. Although claiming trial is not an aggravating factor, no discount would be given to offenders who elect to claim trial: *Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor and other matters* [2020] 2 SLR 1175 at [37] (Kow Keng Siong, *Sentencing Principles in Singapore* (Academy Publishing, Second Ed, 2019) at [20.147]).

26 Antecedents. The Accused had antecedents in 2011 for failing to comply with the condition of the work permit under s 22(1)(A) r/w s 22(1)(I) r/w s 23(1) of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A). No weight was placed on these antecedents as they were fairly dated and unrelated to the present case.

27 Personal Circumstances. The Accused alluded to the fact that as she is the sole bread-winner and a single parent, her incarceration would bring hardship to her family, especially her two daughters aged 10 and 17.³⁵

³⁵ Mitigation Plea at [24]-[31].

28 However, personal circumstances such as financial difficulties and hardship caused to family by their incarceration have no mitigating value save in the most exceptional cases: *Lai Oei Mui Jenny v Public Prosecutor* [1993] 2 SLR(R) 406 at [10]-[11] and *Chua Ya Zi Sandy v Public Prosecutor* [2021] SGHC 204 at [11]-[14].

29 Hardship to the family is a natural consequence when a family's breadwinner decides to commit an offence and is imprisoned for it: *Kannan s/o Birasenggam v Public Prosecutor* [2021] SGCA 15 at [10].

30 In the present case, I saw no cogent reasons to consider her personal financial and family circumstances as valid mitigating factors.

31 Cooperation with the Authorities. I gave due weight to the Accused's cooperation with the authorities.

32 Proportionality Principle. I kept in mind the proportionality principle in sentencing (*Public Prosecutor v Law Aik Meng* [2007] 2 SLR(R) 814 at [30]). Under the proportionality principle, the sentence to be imposed must not only bear a reasonable proportion to the maximum prescribed penalty, but also to the gravity of the offence committed (Kow Keng Siong, *Sentencing Principles in Singapore* (Academy Publishing, Second Ed, 2019) at [06.091]-[06.093]).

Section 306 of the Penal Code

33 Harm. Harm is a measure of the injury caused to society by the commission of the offence (*Public Prosecutor v Koh Thiam Huat* [2017] 4 SLR 1099 at [41]).

34 In the present case, Mr Wee died. Death is generally the most serious

consequence of any offence: *Public Prosecutor v BDB* [2018] 1 SLR 127 at [60].

35 I was mindful that in assessing the level of harm or potential harm, the sentencing court should be careful not to double-count any factors which may already have been taken into account in assessing the level of culpability: *Ye Lin Myint v Public Prosecutor* [2019] 5 SLR 1005 at [58] (see also Andrew Ashworth, *Sentencing and Criminal Justice* (6th Ed, 2015, Cambridge University Press) at [4.3] and [4.5]).

36 Culpability. Culpability is a measure of the degree of relative blameworthiness disclosed by an offender's actions and is measured chiefly in relation to the extent and manner of the offender's involvement in the criminal act: *Public Prosecutor v Aw Tai Hock* [2017] 5 SLR 1141 at [35] (see Andrew Ashworth, *Sentencing and Criminal Justice* (Cambridge University Press, 6th Ed, 2015) at [4.5]).

37 The Accused's culpability can be seen by her handling of the nitrogen tank and IKEA bag at the material time.³⁶

(1) Accused was involved in Mr Wee's suicide plans

38 I agreed with the Prosecution that the Accused was involved in Mr Wee's suicide plans. She referred him to Dr Kwan³⁷ so that his death could be passed off as arising from natural causes. She joined Mr Wee in what she called a "trial run" of his plans to commit suicide.³⁸ And she agreed to oversee Mr

³⁶ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [4(c)(i)].

³⁷ PW14.

³⁸ SOAF at [38].

Wee's funeral arrangements and penned him a eulogy.³⁹

(2) Beneficiary of Life Insurance Policy

39 As of 16 May 2020, the Accused was a beneficiary with a 20% share of a S\$1 million life insurance policy purchased by Mr Wee.⁴⁰

40 According to the Defence:

(a) In return for Mr Wee's kindness, the Accused took out a NTUC Income term insurance policy for \$200,000 with Mr Wee nominated as one of the beneficiaries.⁴¹ This term insurance policy was discontinued later as the Accused was tight financially and "she thought that (Mr Wee) did not continue with his policy so (she) also did not want to continue".⁴²

(b) The Accused told Mr Wee that she did not need his money.⁴³

(c) The Accused had testified that she was financially independent, raising her 2 children independently for 17 years without any credit card debt or personal loan, and that she had never taken a cent from her ex-husband.⁴⁴

³⁹ ASOF at [27]-[29] and [35].

⁴⁰ Prosecution's Closing Submissions at [4]. Defence's Written Submissions at [11].

⁴¹ Defence's Written Submissions at [136(b)].

⁴² Defence's Written Submissions at [136(b)], citing ASOF-20 at [72].

⁴³ Defence's Written Submissions at [11] and [136(a)].

⁴⁴ Defence's Written Submissions at [136(c)].

(d) Mr Wee told the Accused that if he died less than 1 year after the insurance policy had been taken out, she would not receive any money.⁴⁵

(e) If Mr Wee had intended his insurance policy nominees (including the Accused) to receive the insurance payout upon his death, he could have postponed his suicide by a mere 11 days (from 16 May 2020 to 27 May 2020).⁴⁶

41 The Accused did not receive any payout from the life insurance policy.

42 In my judgment, given that the Accused did not ask Mr Wee to postpone his suicide by 11 days (in which case she would be eligible to receive the insurance payout), the fact that the Accused knew that she was a beneficiary of Mr Wee's insurance policy did not animate her acts of intentionally aiding his suicide. In other words, her knowing that she was a beneficiary of his insurance policy should be given no weight in sentencing.

43 My view was fortified by the fact that the Accused had offered to sell her apartment and pass the sales proceeds of between \$100,000 to \$150,000 to Mr Wee.⁴⁷ Mr Wee had declined her offer of goodwill.⁴⁸ The Accused also transferred \$8,000 to Mr Wee,⁴⁹ loaned him \$2,000 and offered Mr Wee a job in her funeral business.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Defence's Written Submissions at [11].

⁴⁶ Defence's Written Submissions at [136(e) and (h)].

⁴⁷ Defence's Written Submissions at [144(d)], citing ASOF-19 at [24]. Mitigation Plea at [77(g)].

⁴⁸ Defence's Written Submissions at [144(d)], citing ASOF-19 at [24].

⁴⁹ Defence's Written Submissions at [144(b)].

⁵⁰ Defence's Written Submissions at [144(c)]. Mitigation Plea at [42(b)].

(3) Public Prosecutor v Lim Tee Hian

44 In *Public Prosecutor v Lim Tee Hian* [1991] 2 SLR(R) 393, the High Court stated that the offence of abetment of suicide could range from one committed under circumstances where the abettor acted out of altruism or mercy to relieve pain suffered by a terminally-ill principal whom he loves to one committed for profit or some evil motive (at [75]).

45 In *Lim Tee Hian*, the offender was convicted after a trial and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment for the s 306 Penal Code offence. He had instigated the deceased to commit suicide (at [71]).

46 The High Court in *Lim Tee Hian* stated that it was “indisputably a very serious case of abetment of suicide at the heart of which was the wanton greed of the accused to profit by fraud on insurance companies and which involved the grievous loss of an innocent life. It was planned over a period of time. The accused manipulated and took heartless advantage of the love and devotion of a naive and simple-minded girl who he knew loved him so much and so deeply that she was even prepared to sacrifice her own life to get him out of the mortal danger from the phantom creditors which he artfully persuaded her were real and imminent” (at [75]).

47 Given the facts and circumstances of *Lim Tee Hian*, the Accused was less culpable than the offender in *Lim Tee Hian*.

Section 204A of the Penal Code

(1) Parthiban a/l Kanapathy v Public Prosecutor

48 The Court of Appeal in *Parthiban a/l Kanapathy v Public Prosecutor* [2021] 2 SLR 847 stated that:⁵¹

(a) General deterrence ought to be the primary sentencing consideration for s 204A of the Penal Code.⁵²

(b) Offences under s 204A of the Penal Code included situations where offenders seek to obstruct the course of justice by eradicating or fabricating evidence of their own wrongdoing or that of others, whether to conceal acts of another or of one's own transgressions.⁵³

(c) A multitude of factors, both offence-specific and offender-specific, may be considered in determining the relevant sentence to be imposed. For example, in assessing the extent of wrongdoing, the nature of the predicate charge upon which the offender had sought to thwart the course of justice is relevant. The more serious it is, the more serious the act of perverting the course of justice will be (see the High Court decision in *Seah Hock Thiam v Public Prosecutor* [2013] SGHC 136 at [8]). Relatedly, the effect of the attempt to pervert the course of justice is also relevant, as is the case where offenders have perverted the course of justice in order to protect their own perceived interests.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [7].

⁵² Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [7(a)].

⁵³ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [7(b)].

⁵⁴ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [7(c)].

(d) The degree of persistence, premeditation and sophistication in the commission of the offences may also indicate the culpability of the accused person (see the District Court decision in *Public Prosecutor v Lim Chit Foo* [2019] SGDC 48 at [122]).⁵⁵

49 The Court of Appeal in *Parthiban a/l Kanapathy* at [29] affirmed the High Court’s sentence for the s 204A offence of one year and nine months’ imprisonment. Amongst other things, the predicate offence that the appellant’s actions were aimed at subverting – that of a capital charge – is the most serious conceivable (*Parthiban a/l Kanapathy* at [28]).

50 For completeness, in *Public Prosecutor v S Iswaran*, the High Court stated that there is no general principle that, in relation to offences under s 204A(a) of the Penal Code, the court should maintain “a degree of proportionality ... by imposing a substantially lower sentence for the [s 204A(a)] offence than for the predicate offence” (at [118]). The High Court also disagreed that it was less serious to obscure the true facts than to destroy evidence (at [120]).

51 I agreed with the Prosecution that:

(a) The predicate offence is extremely serious – this concerns the Accused’s abetment and involvement in Mr Wee’s suicide.⁵⁶ The prescribed punishment for the s 306 offence is imprisonment which may extend to 10 years, and the offender shall also be liable to fine.

⁵⁵ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [7(c)].

⁵⁶ Prosecution’s Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(a)].

(b) There was a degree of persistence, premeditation, and sophistication on the Accused's part,⁵⁷ including significant discussions between the Accused and Mr Wee as to how to get rid of the evidence.⁵⁸

(c) The Accused undertook considerable efforts to bring these plans about, including instructing Mr Cheo⁵⁹ to remove evidence (the nitrogen tank), disposing of the IKEA bag herself, and lying to SSSgt Munira⁶⁰ to conceal Mr Wee's suicide.⁶¹

Sentences to run consecutively

52 As a general rule, sentences for unrelated offences should run consecutively, while sentences for offences that form part of a single transaction should run concurrently: *Public Prosecutor v Raveen Balakrishnan* [2018] 5 SLR 799 at [41], [54] and [98(b)].

53 In the present case, all things considered, I was satisfied that both of the custodial sentences should run consecutively. Both charges related to different legally protected interests. The s 306 offence concerned punishing the voluntary facilitation of ending someone else's life.⁶² The s 204A offence concerned the prevention of offences against justice by acts having the effect of hindering the course of justice (*S Iswaran* at [154]).

⁵⁷ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(b)].

⁵⁸ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(b)(i)].

⁵⁹ PW10.

⁶⁰ PW16.

⁶¹ Prosecution's Skeletal Submissions on Sentence at [8(b)(iii)].

⁶² Penal Code Review Committee Report (August 2018) at page 345.

Totality principle

54 The sentence was in line with both limbs of the totality principle: *Mohamed Shouffee Bin Adam* at [54] and [57].

55 Sentence. All told, in the round, I sentenced the Accused as follows:

DAC No.	Sentence	Status
DAC 921296 2021 s 306 Penal Code	66 months	Consecutive
DAC 920605 2021 s 204A Penal Code	8 months	Consecutive
Total	74 months	

Conclusion

56 The Prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt against the Accused. She was convicted on both charges.

57 She was sentenced to a global imprisonment term of 74 months.

58 The offence of abetting suicide clearly signals society's opposition to suicide.⁶³ Life is sacred.

⁶³ Penal Code Review Committee Report (August 2018), paraphrasing page 348.

59 I am grateful for the hard work and submissions of the Prosecution and the Defence.

Shawn Ho
District Judge

Marcus Foo and Cheronne Lim (Attorney-General's Chambers) for
the Prosecution;
Peter Ong and Marcus Lim (Peter Ong Law Corporation) for the
Defence.
